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Consumer Service Transactions, Implied Warranty
and a Mandate for Realistic Reform
ANDY NORMAN*
INTRODUCTION

That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules
of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness
of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and
which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law
represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights
have become vested in reliance upon the old rule. . ..
This quote reflects the tenor of this article. The article is concerned with achieving justice by discarding the outmoded rules of
law currently applied to consumer service transactions. An implied
warranty of results to be achieved by the rendition of a service is
not only just but in most cases is practical. This article proposes a
test that would take into account the complexity of each individual
service rendered to determine which results can be warranted and
which cannot be warranted from each service.
Application of the implied warranty doctrine to consumer service transactions is long overdue. Consumer product transactions
have run the judicial gamut from caveat emptor through negligence to implied warranty and strict liability. 2 Each extension of
consumer protection has resulted from an increased judicial awareness of the inability of consumers to protect themselves from defects in products.3 The importance of extending the fullest possible
protection to consumers of products now has been recognized by
* Member, Illinois Bar, B.A., Northern Illinois University, J.D., South Texas College of

Law.
1. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 561-62 (Tex. 1968), quoting B. CARDOZO, The
Nature of the Judicial Process, at 150-51.
2. The terms "products" and "goods" are used interchangeably during the course of this

article.
3. Comment, What Price Nobility? The Recovery of Economic Loss in Texas After
Nobility Homes v. Shivers, 19 S. TEx. L.J. 292, 294 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
What Price Nobility?]
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the judiciary." Paradoxically, consumers harmed by defective services have not been accorded similar protection by the judiciary.
Only the negligence doctrine is available as a vehicle for recovery
of damages resulting from the defective rendition of a service.5 It is
the thesis of this article that consumers are no better able to protect their interests when purchasing services than when purchasing
products. This inability justifies extending implied warranty protection to consumer service transactions.
This article will illustrate the lack of power of consumers in the
marketplace and the ineffectiveness of the negligence doctrine to
supply necessary consumer protection. It will outline the development of a public policy devoted to the protection of consumers and
the specific policies which justify the reform of the law governing
consumer service transactions. Finally, it will advocate a consumertort analysis of necessary reforms. At the center of these reforms
will be a test for an implied warranty of results to be achieved
from rendition of a service.
This article advocates a level of judicial activism which may be
unacceptable to some authorities.' However, it has been the courts
which for more than a century have promoted and implemented a
public policy devoted to protecting consumers.7 This level of activism has become a necessary part of the growth of consumer protection. Moreover, the judiciary constitutes the last bastion of justice
in overseeing consumer transactions. As a matter of public policy
the law must interpose itself in order to regulate a particular category of transactions which might otherwise result in inequity and
oppression.8

4.

See text accompanying notes 51-66, infra.

5. This is the only doctrine imposed by law. The parties to a transaction may, of course,
be found to have imposed a higher standard of conduct upon themselves by contract or
express warranty.
6. See, e.g., Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. Rzv. 713, 775, 780 (1970); R. KEaTON, Venturing To Do Justice:
Reforming Private Law, 122-25 (1969). These authorities indicate that by taking an active
role in the reform of consumer transactions the judiciary may, in some minds, engage in
unwarranted judicial legislation. The view taken here is that judicial application of legislative principles by analogy constitutes a positive and legitimate approach to the role of the
judiciary. See, Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAav. L. REv. 383, 384 (1908).
7.

See text accompanying notes 66-98 infra.

8. Singal, Extending Implied Warranties Beyond Goods: Equal Protection for Consumers of Services, 12 N. ENG. L. Rzv. 859 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Singal].
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THE CONTEMPORARY MARKETPLACE-AN UNFRIENDLY
ENVIRONMENT FOR CONSUMERS OF SERVICES

A number of marketplace factors open the door to consumer disappointment with the services they procure. High expectations for
results to be achieved from rendition of a service are often engendered by a one way flow of information about the service from the
service-provider to the consumer. 9 The lack of intra-class communication between consumers,10 coupled with the tendencies of consumers to take information at face value" frequently result in the
failure of consumers to temper their expectations in a realistic way.
Furthermore, attempts made by consumers to assure quality in the
services they procure and generally to protect their interests are
frequently thwarted by their lack of bargaining power and their
necessary reliance on the skill and honesty of their service-providers. 12 Each of these factors, when analyzed individually, indicates a
need for judicial protection of service-consumers. Indeed, these
same marketplace factors brought about great changes in product
liability law.
Consumer Expectations
One of the factors which has been most instrumental in the reformation of product liability law is the need to protect consumer
expectations for product quality." Implied warranty of the quality
of products and strict products liability have flowed directly from
the judicial perception that consumers purchase products with certain expectations of quality.14 Moreover, authorities on product liability law have recognized that consumer expectations for quality

9. These factors have been recognized in consumer product transactions. "This is a question of consumer. Of helpless consumer. Of consumer who takes what he gets, because he
does not know enough, technically, to test even what is before his eyes." Llewellyn, On
Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 404 (1937).
10. Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of Consumer Protection:Doctrine, Function and
Legal Liability For Product Disappointment,60 VA..L. REV. 1109, 1124-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Shapo].
11. Id. at 1304-1311.
12. Singal, supra note 8, at 878-85.
13. Shapo, supra note 10, at 1113-1117, advocates the importance of a representational
approach to consumer protection. From pages 1204 through 1286 he demonstrates through
caselaw analysis the effect the representational context of a consumer transaction has on
consumer expectations and the importance courts have attached to such representations.
14. The concepts of merchantability and strict products liability were introduced via the
courts to focus on resulting product performance as expected by product purchasers.
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in products are created in a vast number of ways. 15 Consumer expectations are no less prevalent in service transactions than in
product transactions. The efforts made by judges and other authorities to mold product liability so as to protect consumer expectations should be fully persuasive in attempts to reform the law
governing service transactions.
In product liability law, the most basic expectation-oriented rule
is the law of express warranty. 16 Virtually all authorities recognize
the creation of consumer expectations by promises of product
quality made by sellers and advertisers.17 Any affirmations of fact
by a product seller that become part of'the "basis of the bargain"
struck with a consumer are guaranteed by the law of express warranty.'6 This is one manner in which the law of express warranty
protects consumer expectations for product quality. Such affirmations of fact are also guaranteed by express warranty in service
transactions. 9 Thus, if a doctor promises that a cure of the consumer's disease will result from his method of treatment, the law
of express warranty will protect the consumer's expectation of
cure. To this extent, consumer expectations are protected equally
in product and service transactions. However, it is when analysis
transcends this basic rule of express warranty that the pervasiveness of consumer expectations can be discerned. An analysis of the
great extent to which product liability law has been reformed to
protect expectations illustrates the want of such reform in the law
of service liability. Recognizing the broad range of communications
which creates expectations, the courts have even extended the law
of express warranty to include non-verbal promises made by sellers, such as when they silently exhibit product models and samples.20 When an automobile salesman shows, without any verbal
communication, a car with power windows to a prospective purchaser, the law of express warranty will guarantee that the car subsequently purchased will have power windows if they were an

15. Shapo, supra note 10, at 1304. Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of
Economic Loss in American Products Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 647, 674-5 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Edmeades].
16. Express warranty is found in its most well known form in section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
17. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97 at 651 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER).
18. Id.
19. Greenfield, Consumer Protectionin Service Transactions-ImpliedWarranties and
Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. R. 661, 663.
20. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313(1)(c) and comment 6 thereto.
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inducement to purchase. Moving beyond the farthest edges of express warranty, judges and other authorities have held that consumer expectations for quality are created merely by a product's
presence on the market.' 1 Similarly, they have recognized that consumer expectations can be derived from a complex of nebulous
messages and images that surround a consumer transaction. This
extremely broad representational context includes, in service transactions, the image of competence and authority that is subconsciously portrayed by a lawyer's lavish office. In a similar manner,
the holding out of one's self as an "attorney" or a "doctor" or even
as a "mechanic" imparts to the consumer a message of competence
to perform a service.
Furthermore, it has been recognized that the collection of consumer experiences possessed by society as a whole lends to the creation of consumer expectations for product quality apart from any
promises, messages or images sent by a service-provider. 2" This social consensus about a product will indicate to an individual consumer a minimum performance he can expect from the product.
Thus, because society collectively has had much experience with
refrigerators and cars, the individual consumer will feel justified in
expecting his refrigerator to keep his food cold and his car to have
properly functioning brakes and transmission. 2 The law of product
liability has grown to reflect the numerous factors that go into the
creation of expectations for product quality. It is apparent that a
single product transaction may include specific verbal promises,
specific non-verbal promises, general assurances, nebulous
messages of competence and subconscious image portrayals, plus
preconceived societal notions of what is to be expected from a
service.
It is unfortunate for consumers of services that judicial solicitude for consumer expectations of results has not progressed beyond the narrow bounds of express warranty.' 4 The implied warranty of results advocated in this article would extend full
protection of consumer expectations to service transactions. This

21. See, e.g., Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 311
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
Edmeades, supra note 15.
22. Shapo, supra note 10, at 1240.
23. Edmeades, supra note 15, at 674.
24. Since the doctrine of negligence focuses only upon the standard of care used
service-provider in rendering the service, consumer expectations for results from the
are ignored by that doctrine.

(1965);
(1963);

by the
service
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protection is no less justified than in product transactions." Just
as consumer expectations for the performance of a product create
the incentive to purchase that product, it is consumer expectations
for results from a service that create the incentive to procure that
service.
In a manner similar to product transactions, the expectations for
results can derive from any number of sources. Consumer expectations are created by the message of competence sent by a serviceprovider who undertakes, for a fee, to provide a service. As a corollary, when the service-provider holds himself out as an "attorney"
or "mechanic", a message of competence to achieve intended results is communicated to the consumer. Just as the consumer will
expect his car to have properly functioning brakes and transmission, the consumer will expect his attorney to be able to draft a
will or a title abstract accurately and his mechanic to be able to
make his car run adequately. The collection of consumer service
experiences creates a social consensus about the results to be expected from procurement of an attorney's or a mechanic's service.2 6
Furthermore, consumer expectations may be enhanced by the image of competence and authority portrayed, for example, by the
lawyer's lavish office. Recognition of the existence of consumer expectations for results from services should indicate to courts the
need for a service-provider's implied warranty of results.
One-Way Flow of Information
The need for an implied warranty of results from a service is
further necessitated by the one-way flow of information about the
service from service-provider to consumer. In most cases it is the
service-provider who sets the stage upon which his service is por-

25. When a consumer procures a service, he expects results to be achieved from the service. Thus, when the consumer brings his car in for a tune-up he expects his car to accelerate well, get good mileage and not die at stops. His mind is geared to these results. He does
not think in terms of reasonable care or prudence in tuning the car. It is true that in complex service transactions he will have doubts in his mind as to whether certain results can
realistically be accomplished. A consumer with a disease cannot usually be sure that a particular medical treatment will cure his disease. However, his focus is not on his doctor's
ordinary care but on the achievement of a cure tempered by the complexity of the situation.
The implied warranty of results advocated in this article takes exactly this approach. It
begins with a result-oriented focus and tempers the extent of implied warranty with the
complexity involved in achieving the result.
26. Thus, in the same manner in which a consumer will expect certain minimum results
from his car or refrigerator, he will expect certain minimum results from services provided
by furniture movers, camera repairers, doctors, and landscapers.
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trayed and who arranges the lighting.2 7 Thus, to a large degree
consumers will be cue responsive, that is, their marketplace decisions will be influenced by the flow of information from the service-provider. 28 Consistent with this analysis is the growing dissatisfaction with the utilitarian model in which the consumer
procures a service after weighing his need for it against the cost of
its procurement. 29 The pervasive influence of advertising and fads
in general in our affluent society further suggests great consumer
cue responsiveness. The danger arising out of this one-way flow of
information is that the consumer may not fully and accurately perceive the risks of disappointment he runs when procuring the service. Any incompatability between the service-provider's profit motive and the consumer's interest in receiving a quality service is
likely to adversely affect the consumer.
The often unthinking and credulous tendencies of many consumers compound the likelihood that they will be frustrated by a
lack of quality in the services they procure.3 0 Contrary to the "reasonable man" standard, the ordinary consumer does not always
temper his expectations in a realistic way. An implied warranty of
results would reflect that, unlike ordinary business-buyers, consumers tend to be careless or negligent by ordinary standards in
making marketplace decisions. 81 When such class-wide tendencies
become apparent, it is the duty of the law to account for them. 2
Unequal Market Power
The most compelling justification for protecting consumer expectations arises out of consumer's lack of marketplace power to
protect their expectations. In product transactions, the imposition
of implied warranty and strict products liability has been justified
in part by the consumer's lack of knowledge about the process of
product manufacture.33 Quality control in the manufacture and
distribution of products is left to the seller's supervision. Thus,
consumers are forced to rely on the skill and honesty of product

27. Shapo, supra note 10, at 1161, referring to product transactions.
28. Comment, Guidelines for Extending Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125
U. PA. L. R. 365, 371-374 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Extending Implied
Warranties].
29. Shapo, supra note 10, at 1151-52.
30. Id. at 1305-11.
31. Comment, What Price Nobility?, supra note 3, at 306.
32. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
33. Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 309 (1965).
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sellers in providing quality products. In service transactions, this
reliance factor is even greater. An inherent lack of consumer
knowledge about the process of providing a service is compounded
by the fact that services require, in most cases, the utilization of
extraordinary skills. Furthermore, unlike with a tangible product, a
consumer cannot pick up a service and examine it or get a feel for
how it works.
Even when the consumer understands the process, the lack of
consumer bargaining power adds to the consumer's necessary reliance on his service-provider. He usually is forced to procure services on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. To the consumer, freedom of
contract usually means subjugation by adhesion contract.3 ' When a
transaction breaks down, consumer expectations are frequently left
by the wayside. Although some authorities contend that consumer
bargaining power exists in the right to refuse to contract, 5 the lack
of consumer communication about the differences in the cost and
competence of competing service-providers reduces the effectiveness of this power.3 6 Similarly, standardized mass contracts tend to
37
be the rule among many competing service-providers.
The coexistence of consumer expectations for results from services with the service-provider's ability to achieve many of those
results provides the basis for a standard of service liability that
guarantees those results which are achieveable. The need for such
a standard of liability is accentuated by the one-way flow of information from service-provider to consumer and by the consumer's
inability to assure that achievable results are in fact achieved.
However, because of a long recognized distinction between products and services, service consumers are denied many protections
afforded the product consumer.
THE ARTIFICIAL JUDICIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN

PRODUCTS AND SERVICES LEADS TO ANOMOLOus RESULTS
FOR DAMAGED CONSUMERS

The judicial distinction between products and services that exists today was recognized prior to the widespread acceptance of
34.
35.

Comment, What Price Nobility?, supra note 3, at 306.
See, e.g., J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, Uniform Commercial Code, § 4-4 at 119 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as J. WHITE AND R. SuMMERS].
36. Comment, Extending Implied Warranties, supra note 28, at 382.
37. The existence of such contracts is promoted by organizations of product and serviceproviders such as the Texas Automobile Dealers Association and the Texas Apartment
Association.
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consumer protection policy. 8s rt is unfortunate for consumers that
by the time consumer protection began its headway into the marketplace the distinction between products and services had become
ossified. 8 9 The logical similarities between product and service
transactions have been, and continue to be, overlooked. Reasonable consumer expectations coupled with the consumer's inability to
protect his interests in the marketplace have been the justifications
for great changes in the law of product transactions. These same
qualities, however, have engendered little modification of the law
governing service transactions.
The judicial distinction between product and service transactions originally developed around a distinction that remains today.
Products often involve large volume trading at a distance between
parties who have no contractual relations. Services, on the other
hand, usually involve a single transaction between two parties who
deal directly with each other. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries this distinction served a valid commercial purpose. It justified application of an implied warranty of quality to product transactions in order to achieve commercial stability.40 However, from
the point of view of a modern consumer burdened by a defective
product or service, this distinction is virtually meaningless.
The early implied warranty was an ancestor of the implied warranty advocated in this article. However, the original warranty was
created not for consumer protection purposes, but purely to impart
stability into the turbulent times of the genesis of the industrial
revolution. At that time, the warranty was not necessary for service
transactions because services lacked large volume trading at a distance and they were not being industrialized at a revolutionary
pace. 41 By the mid-19th century, however, implied warranty developed a noticeable consumer protection aspect. 42 At this point, the
extension of implied warranty to service transactions would have
been logical. However, by parroting without analyzing, courts continued to apply warranties only to products and retained the distinction between product and service transactions."3 This artificial

38. Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New IndustrialState: The
Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 401, 404
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Enterprise Liability).
39. Id. at 409.
40. Id. at 404-05.
41. Id.
42. Singal, supra note 8, at 878-79.
43. Thus, courts concluded that implied warranty had no application beyond the sale of
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distinction was preserved upon passage of the English Sales of
Goods Act in 1894.1" This Act excluded services from the purview
of the implied warranty doctrine. The narrow promulgation of implied warranty was copied in the United States with the passage of
the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.45
This ossified distinction has resulted in the anomaly which forms
the basis for this article. Consumer protection has spread inexorably in reforming the law of product transactions. More than a
century of reforms has shifted the risks of damage caused by defective products from consumer to seller. The role of consumer
protection policy in product transactions has been so forceful that
distributors and retailers may be liable even for manufacturing defects in products in containers sealed by the manufacturer. 4 Despite the fact that consumers are no better able to protect their
interests when procuring services than when procuring products,
consumer reforms have not spread to the service sector. As if left
in a vacuum for over a century, consumers of services are still subjected to the privity defense, 47 restrictive notions of representational and express warranty liability,4" unlimited disclaimers of
liability,40 less protection from unconscionability, 0 and, in general,
remnant notions of caveat emptor. In addition, the service consumer's only cause of action for recovery, negligence, creates insurmountable obstacles to acquiring adequate relief.
THE NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROVIDE
ADEQUATE CONSUMER PROTECTION

Currently, only the doctrine of negligence is utilized by the vast
majority of courts in the United States to protect consumers from

goods context despite its logical application to the leasing of goods, sale and leasing of real
property and rendering of services.
44. Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 38, at 408.
45. The English Sale of Goods Act, the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code all assured the exclusion of service transactions from the implied warranty doctrine by
expressly incorporating within its purview only the sale of goods. Judicial expansion by
analogy, thus, was discouraged. "Deference to Legislative will caused judges to view the
legislature as preempting the warranty field." Id. at 410.
46. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 100 at 664-65.
47. See text accompanying notes 71-95 infra for a discussion of the elimination of the
privity defense in products cases. None of these cases or statutes have been applied to consumers not in privity with the service-provider.
48. See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra.
49. There is currently no generally accepted statutory or common law limitation on a
service-provider's right to disclaim liability for defects in his service.
50. See text accompanying notes 251-259 infra.

19801

Consumer Service Transactions

defective services." ' In contrast, however, the ineffectiveness of
negligence to protect consumers from defective products has been
recognized by virtually every court in the United States. 2 The
inappropriateness of negligence, with its focus upon care used, to
protect consumers has been articulated in the following manner:
In any case in which a seller purveys goods by creating an image
of them in the buyer's mind . . . it is curious that relief for justifiable disappointment should depend upon the conduct of the
manufacturing process ....
The inducement to purchase, which
is crucial to distribution, lies in the management of communication rather than supervision of manufacture.6 3
This should demonstrate to the judiciary the inappropriateness of
the negligence doctrine in consumer service transactions. Most
courts, however, continue to apply only negligence to consumer
service transactions."
There are four main reasons why negligence is inappropriate to
protect consumers from defective services: (1) negligence, in effect,
applies a 19th century social philosophy to 20th century consumer
service transactions; (2) it ignores the consumer's reasonable expectations for results to be achieved by rendition of a service; (3) it
imposes a burden of proof which in many cases is virtually impossible to meet; and (4) through its embrace of the ordinary it eliminates the incentive to provide the best service possible.- Similarly,
it allows the broad shield of industry custom to be used as a defense to consumer recoveries.
Out-Dated Social Philosophy
In the mid-19th century, the negligence standard was a widely
accepted doctrine that was applied to a wide range of human activities." By that time, it had fully replaced the previous standard of
liability which imposed absolute liability on persons for all injuries
to other persons or property that followed as a direct and immediate consequence from a voluntary act.56 In comparison to this standard of liability, the negligence doctrine was seen as progressive
because it comported with 19th century laissez-faire individualism.

51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

This is the only standard imposed by law apart from the actions of the parties.
See 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4050 (1977).
Shapo, supra note 10, at 1197-98.
Greenfield, supra note 19, at 663.
PRossrt, supra note 17, § 28; Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 38, at 415.
Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 38, at 415.
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Thus, it was no surprise that the development of the negligence
standard coincided with the rise of the industrial revolution.57 Use
of negligence represented a "conscious choice by common law
courts to immunize industry to a great degree from potential liability."' 8 The reversal of risks involved in the development of the
negligence standard was a result of the laissez-faire emphasis on
industrial expansion at the expense of the individual. 59 However,
the emphasis on industrial expansion no longer constitutes a social
policy. In consumer transactions, protection of consumer welfare
has become the ruling policy.60 Thus, the prime motivation for the
utilization of negligence no longer exists in consumer transactions.
Consumer Expectations Neglected
To prove the negligent rendition of a service, a consumer must
show that the service-provider did not use reasonable care. Reasonable care usually requires a showing that the care used was less
than the care that would be used under the same circumstances by
a reasonable and prudent service-provider. 1 Thus, the negligence
doctrine focuses exclusively upon the process of rendition of the
service and ignores consumer -expectations for results.
For example, although the consumer expects a thorough overhaul of his car to result in a car that gets maximum mileage, shifts
gears properly, brakes when necessary and does not accelerate uncontrollably, the negligence doctrine deals with consumer disappointment by asking only whether the overhaul was done in a
regular manner. Despite the mechanic's representations of competence, if the consumer's car runs into a tree because a wheel bearing was not put in place accurately, no recovery is allowed unless it
is proved that an ordinary mechanic would have installed the
wheel bearing in a different fashion.
Difficulties of Proof
Even if a service is provided in a negligent manner, frequently it
is impossible to prove so.62 The mere fact that rendition of a service has resulted in some form of damage to the consumer is not

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

PROSSER, supra note 17, at 140.
Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 38, at 415.
Id.
Id., at 414-15.
PROSSER, supra note 17, at 150.
Id., at 211.
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evidence of negligence. 63 Rather, proof of a bad result creates no
more than speculation as to the existence of negligence." Yet because of the extraordinary skill and arcane knowledge usually required to provide a service and the fact that a lack of due care is
usually not witnessed by the consumer, specific proof of negligence
is often not possible. Thus, if the consumer pays a contractor several hundred dollars to install a heating system in his home which
fails to provide heat, mere proof of a cold house will not establish
negligence.
Even if the rendition of a service leads to serious injury or death
through no fault of the victim, the cloak of "ordinary prudence"
will serve to guard the service-provider from the consequences of
his errors.65 Thus, if a doctor prescribes two safe medicines which
in combination cause his patient's death, no damages will be recovered if the jury finds that most other doctors would have made a
similar prescription. It is a fundamental thesis of this article that
when the ordinary and prudent service-provider fails to utilize all
available knowledge, a recovery of damages should not be barred.
Adoption of an implied warranty of results would help accomplish
this goal.
Incentive Discouraged
Other side-effects result from a standard requiring only ordinary
prudence. The negligence doctrine deters any interest by the service-provider to keep abreast of the newest developments of techniques and knowledge in his industry. If the average service-provider has not incorporated a recent development into his panoply
of expertise there is no incentive for others to do so. It is true that
new developments must be proven effective over time before they
can be widely implemented. However, only an implied warranty of
results will create an incentive in service-providers to make the
most expeditious analysis of new developments. In addition, the
negligence doctrine, with its focus on reasonable care, creates no
incentive for the service-provider to deal with the consumer in
terms of the latter's expectations of result. The service-provider
imparts information from a frame of reference other than that of
63.

Id.

64. Id.
65. Industry custom and notions of the reasonable man's performance under similar circumstances are the important considerations under the negligence doctrine. In service transactions they are controlling regardless of the availability of knowledge that would have enabled the service-provider to achieve expected results.
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the consumer's. As long as the service-provider uses ordinary prudence in providing the service, he need not concern himself with
expected results. Only a standard of liability that focuses on results can create an incentive in service-providers to think and communicate with consumers in terms of consumer expectations for
results.
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE INABILITY OF CONSUMERS
TO PROTECT THEMSELVES-A PUBLIC POLICY DEVOTED TO THE
PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS FROM DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS

Public policy for the protection of consumers has played a great
role in the eclipse of negligence in product transactions."' This
public policy has expanded inexorably for over a century to implement more effective consumer protection. Generally untraditional,
and always concerned with notions of justice, the policy has manifested itself in almost every aspect of the consumer product transaction. This policy has long called for application of an implied
warranty to service transactions. A brief examination of the great
changes wrought in product transactions by consumer protection
policy will demonstrate its logical force for change in consumer service transactions.
The root of the modern public policy for protection of consumers
began to grow in the late 18th century. 67 The courts began to find
warranties of quality implicit in the circumstances of a sale in the
absence of any express undertaking by the seller.6 8 Thus, the contract of the parties was not to be the only source of remedies for
the sale of defective goods. This development was received favorably in the United States by 1815, when in dicta the New York
Court of Appeals suggested that an implied warranty of wholesomeness in the sale of provisions for immediate consumption

66. For example, the purpose of strict products liability is to "insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 707, 377
P.2d 897, 901 (1963). "[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that
the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment c.
67. Edmeades, supra note 15, at 652.
68. Id. at 652-53.
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should be developed. 69 This food warranty was based from the outset on the public policy of protecting consumers powerless to protect themselves.70
By the mid-19th century the force for consumer reform led the
judiciary to begin dismantling the privity defense. By 1852, just
ten years after the introduction of the privity rule, negligence actions were broadened to allow consumers to sue those manufacturers with whom they were not in privity for physical injuries caused
by "inherently dangerous" defective products."' "Inherently dangerous" was interpreted, at first, to include only those products
that were innately dangerous such as poisons, knives, explosives
and similar products. 7 As circumventing the privity rule became

more popular with the courts, this category grew to embrace a substantial number of products. The "inherently dangerous" category
came to include many "non-inherently dangerous" products such
as scaffolds, 73 ladders 74 and coffee urns. 75 This paved the way for

Justice Cardozo to abrogate the privity rule for physical injuries
caused in any case in which the manufacturer could foresee that
his product could cause injury if defectively made.7
By 1913, courts began to allow injured consumers without privity
to recover for breach of warranty against growers and processors of
unwholesome food. 7 This step indicated a significant trend in
product liability law because courts then could hold a handler of a
defective product liable to a buyer not in privity, regardless of the
fact that all reasonable precautions were taken in the handling of
the product.7 8 The adaptation of the warranties to this extra-contractual role rapidly found favor in a majority of courts as a vehicle
for circumventing the privity rule.7 ' The scope of the warranty was

expanded beyond food in some jurisdictions to include any product
69. Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns 467 (N.Y. 1815); Edmeades, supra note 15, at 658.
70. Edmeades, supra note 15, at 658.
71. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Davis, 60 S.W. 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) is an early Texas
case on this point.
72. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 383, 111 N.E. 1050, 1051-2 (1916).
73. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
74. Schubert v. J.C. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892).
75. Stadtler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909).
76. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
77. Mazetti v. Armour and Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913) (on the theory of an
implied representation that the food was safe).
78. Id. at 630, 135 P. at 636.
79. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 97 at 653.
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which was expected to come into intimate contact with the body,"0
including soaps, 81 cosmetics' and even animal food."3 Like the
rules of tort law, liability in implied warranty was widely believed
to be imposed by law for reasons of policy rather than as a result
of an agreement between the parties. 4
In the early 20th century, courts developed other methods for
circumventing the privity defense. Many courts began to broaden
their concept of what constituted an express warranty by the manufacturer to the consumer.' 5 Thus, many advertisements and labels
were found to contain express warranties to consumers.86 Some
courts held that consumers were entitled to sue because they were
third party beneficiaries of a contract between the manufacturer
and dealer. 87 Others found an agency relationship between either
the manufacturer and dealer or dealer and consumer. 8 Still others
held that dealers assigned or sold their rights against the manufacturer to consumers with purchase of the product.""
Some courts have finished the dismantling of the privity defense
by completely abolishing it in product transactions. 90 In the 1950's
and 1960's the food warranty was expanded to cover a wide variety
of products.' Unlike the warranties of the Uniform Sales Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code, the newly expanded food warranty
was based solely on consumer protection policy. It was imposed by
operation of law and could not be disclaimed by product sellers. 2
A similar form of warranty was extended to include the lease and
bailment of products 3 and beyond products to the sale and rental
of housing. 4
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
(1962).

86.

Kruper v. Procter & Gamble, 160 Ohio 108, 113 N.E. 2d 605 (1953).
Id.
Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
Edmeades, supra note 15, at 661.
Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399

Id.

87. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
88. Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 P. 1050 (1929).
89. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 976, 111 So. 305 (1927).
90. This was recently accomplished in Texas in the case of Nobility Homes of Texas,
Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W. 2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977).
91. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALz L.J. 1099, 1112 (1960). The warranty was no longer limited to food or products expected to come into intimate contact with
the body but appeared to be applicable to virtually every product on the market.
92. Singal, supra note 8, at 874-78.
93. See, e.g., W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
94. See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) and Kamarath v. Bennett,
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In addition, the doctrine of strict liability in tort, expressly
created to protect consumer expectations, was adopted in rapid order by virtually every court in the United States. 5 Similar to the
implied warranty in food cases, the strict liability theory imposes
liability, apart from any negligence, on any party in the product's
chain of distribution for physical injuries to a buyer caused by any
defective product."' As a matter of public policy, the strict liability
rule "insure[s] that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturer who put such products on
the market rather than
by the injured persons who are powerless
' 97
to protect themselves.
In recognition of this development of strong consumer protection
in products law and of the inadequacy of the negligence doctrine,
several cases scattered among various jurisdictions have foreshadowed the coming of implied warranty to service transactions."8
These few courts have been willing to question the viability of the
product-service distinction. Since most of the reforms brought
about by consumer protection policy began with a trickle and
ended with a flood, the expansion of consumer protection reforms
into service transactions may be imminent. An implied warranty
doctrine which is flexible enough to account for the amount of con-

568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
95. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 657-58. However, this is questionable in light of the limitation of the doctrine to personal injury and property damage only.
96. A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P. 2d 897 (1963).
97. Id.
98. Realmutto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974) (installation of
auto parts); Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (dissent--eye care);
Johnson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis..1973) (hospital services);
Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316
(1972) (supplying of electricity); Jeffreys v. Hickman, 132 Il1. App. 2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 110
(1971) (painting of automobile); Reilly v. King Co. Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App.
172, 492 P.2d 246 (1971) (supplying of blood); Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem. Hosp., 47 I11.
2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) (supplying of blood); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Clinton Campbell
Contractor, Inc., 10 Ariz. App. 371, 459 P.2d 98 (1969) (installation of wiring); Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (misapplication of hair product); Magrine v.
Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (dissent-dental
care); Woodrick v. Smith Gas Serv., Inc., 87 Ill. App.2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967) (installation of auto parts); McCool v. Hoover Equip. Co., 415 P.2d 954 (Okla. 1966) (application of
chrome to crankshafts); Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963)
(drainage plans and specifications); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 12
Cal. Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897 (1961) (installation of heating system); Miller v. Winters, 144
N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (installation of heating system).
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trol a service-provider has over achieving results, such as the one
advocated in this article, should allow courts to extend this needed
protection to consumers of services.
EXTENDING JUDICIAL PROTECTION TO CONSUMER SERVICE
TRANSACTIONS-THE

POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF RESULTS

This section briefly outlines some of the consumer protection
policies which specifically warrant application of the implied warranty doctrine to consumer service transactions. Some of these policies have already been mentioned: the need for judicial recognition of the existence and importance of consumer expectations; the
positive effect implied warranty would have in promoting disclosures by the service-provider in terms of what results are expected from a service; the inappropriateness of applying a doctrine
based on 19th century social policies to transactions with 20th century foundations; and generally, the treating of all consumer transactions equally, regardless of whether they involve a product or a
service, based on the consumer's inability to protect himself.
In addition to these policies, a more fundamental consideration
is important. The most basic notion of 20th century consumer protection policy requires that a business in existence to make a profit
from the public pay its way and meet its social obligations. These
obligations derive from the following policies.
First, the public interest in the protection of human life, health
and safety which paved the way for the application of implied warranty and strict liability in tort to product transactions is no less
applicable to service transactions." It is readily apparent that the
same harmful effects are caused by an accident whether it results
from the sale of a car with a defective choke or from defective installation of the choke.
A second policy recognizes the service-provider's superior ability
to bear the loss caused by defects and to distribute it over the
range of customers. 10 0 Many service businesses are small independents with small profit margins. Yet recognition that many product
sellers are small has not deterred the application of implied warranty and strict liability to those businesses. The general avail-

99. See, HARPER AND JAMES, The Law of Torts, § 28.33 at 1605 (1956).
100. This principle has been recognized in product cases. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

§ 402A, comment c; Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 29 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
TORTS

1980]

Consumer Service Transactions

ability of liability insurance makes the size of the business less important.10 1 Furthermore, spreading the cost of liability insurance
over the range of customers is socially more efficient than leaving
the costs of injury to the unfortunate victims of defective services. 102 Regardless of the availability of insurance, though, public
policy should recognize that businesses are better able than individuals to absorb unexpected financial shocks. The notion of eliminating fault from the service liability equation should not suffer
great resistance in light of the standards currently in effect in
product transactions.
If businesses are forced to bear losses, prices for services may
increase. Concededly, low and middle income consumers would be
least able to afford any increase in prices. These are the same consumers, however, who are least able to afford the consequences of a
defective service. 108 Significantly, some studies indicate that a
move from negligence to implied warranty might not cause an appreciable rise in the price of services.1 "' To the extent that prices
do rise, though, a positive side effect will occur. Although the overall cost of services to society will remain the same, higher prices
will more accurately reflect the individual risk of loss from defective services. ea No longer would a few suffer to keep prices low for
the masses. Purchasers of services would be able to make a more
a6
informed selection.1
A third policy supporting an implied warranty in consumer services recognizes the service-provider's superior ability to determine
whether his service is being rendered properly. The manufacturer
of a product is the only person capable of instituting quality con101. Some of the positive effects of social insurance, whether applied to large or small
businesses have been summed up as follows:
a scheme of social insurance involves (1) liability without fault (within the field of
its operation), (2) an assurance that the amount of compensation theoretically due
under the system will in fact be paid, and (3) a wide, regular and equitable distribution of losses under the system.
HARPER AND JAMES, The Law of Torts, § 13.2 at 763-64 (1956). Furthermore, the number of
injury-producing defects should increase directly in proportion to an increase in volume.
Greenfield, supra note 18, at 691-92.
102. Id.
103. Greenfield, supra note 19, at 695.
104. See, e.g., Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 38, at 440; Greenfield, supra
note 19, at 694-95.
105. Comment, EnterpriseLiability, supra note 55, at 433-41; Greenfield, supra note 19,
at 694-95; Shapo, supra note 10, at 1371-72.
106. G. CALEBRESI, The Costs of Accidents, at 70 (1970).
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trol as the product is being made.1 0 7 The same is true of a serviceprovider as he performs the service. Deterrence of defects before
they occur is the most efficient way to ensure service quality," 8
and to the extent that imposition of a higher standard of liability
on service-providers increases the incentive for quality control, resource allocation is more optimal.
Fourth, imposing an implied warranty in service transactions
would achieve another positive effect that the negligence doctrine
cannot. The negligence standard requires only that service-providers perform in an ordinary fashion. Thus, only when industry custom is declared as a matter of law to be patently unreasonable is
the service-provider encouraged to render a better than average
performance. The implied warranty advocated here would require
that service-providers keep abreast of and apply the newest techniques and advances of knowledge in their industries. 10 9
Finally, in most service transactions, the service-provider is fully
aware of the consumer's expectations for results.1 1 0 The implied
warranty advocated here can help to assure that the service-provider does the best possible job in attempting to achieve expected
results.
THE SUPERIORITY OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OVER

STRICT LIABILITY AS THE VEHICLE FOR
SERVICE LIABILITY REFORM

Implied warranty is preferred over strict liability in tort as the
vehicle for reform of consumer service transactions. However, the
characteristics of these two doctrines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction to suit particular needs."1 These differences may result
in strict liability being more appropriate in a minority of jurisdictions. In a majority of states, however, the implied warranty doc-

107. Greenfield, supra note 19, at 688.
108. Deterrence of defects before they occur is socially more efficient than reservicing or
subsequent additional repairs.
109. Thus, the implied warranty of results advocated in this article allows for the complexity of each service rendered but is based in large part on a policy promoting the greatest
possible utilization of available knowledge by service-providers.
110. For example, when a consumer hires an attorney to draft a will, the attorney should
be fully aware of the results expected by the consumer: the orderly transfer of his property
at his death to intended beneficiaries. Similarly, when a consumer hires a mechanic to overhaul the brakes on his car the mechanic should fully realize that the consumer expects his
car to have properly functioning brakes.
111. Differences regarding the recovery of economic loss and the application of privity
and disclaimers in particular can be seen in the various jurisdictions.
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trine possesses more flexibility- than strict liability in tort and
should be the logical preference.
According to Dean Prosser, implied warranty is a "freak hybrid
born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."1 1 This theoretical combination has confused some courts as to the purposes of
1 1 3 In actuality, this varied background gives imimplied warranty.
plied warranty the ability to reflect the contractual aspect of a consumer service transaction while it sets the public policy standards
of quality. On some occasions an implied warranty might display
contractual qualities, being promissory in nature and part of a bargained-for agreement.1 14 A person contracting to insulate a house
from termites can logically be held to have impliedly warranted
that after being insulated the house will be free from termites.1
At other times, an implied warranty might be interpreted as tortious in nature, exhibiting qualities of an obligation or duty imposed for public policy reasons.' This is evident when a mechanic
is held to impliedly warrant that he will not install a rebuilt carburetor in a consumer's car so as to cause an accident.1 7 Strict liability as applied in most jurisdictions lacks this varied nature.1 18
Another distinction between implied warranty and strict liability
involves the recovery of economic loss. Economic loss constitutes a
large portion of all losses suffered by consumers of defective services. Therefore, a doctrine that facilitates the recovery of economic loss as well as personal injury and property damage is required to fully effect consumer protection principles. In cases
involving solely economic loss, strict liability is held to be inapposite in most jurisdictions.' 19 Most jurisdictions, however, allow the
recovery of economic losses under implied warranty.1 20 Elimination
of the privity defense in cases of economic loss brought under implied warranty 2 ' adds to the viability of that doctrine for protecting consumers.
A third difference between the doctrines involves the ability of a

112. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
113. Id. at 1133-34.
114. Edmeades, supra note 15 at 662.
115. King v. Ohio Valley Terminex Co., 309 Ky. 35, 214 S.W.2d 993 (1948).
116. Edmeades, supra note 15 at 662.
117. Woodrick v. Smith Gas Service, Inc., 87 Ill.
App. 2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967).
118. In most jurisdictions strict liability is based solely upon public policy and contains
no notions of contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment m.
119. Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 1977).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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service-provider to shift the risk of loss, better known as the disclaimer doctrine. In most jurisdictions, a seller may not disclaim
strict liability, 2 2 but he is permitted to disclaim implied warranties. This article recognizes the appropriateness of a limited mechanism for the shifting of the risk of loss.' 2 Therefore, implied warranty is more appropriate.
Finally, "strict liability" or "liability without fault" would be a
misnomer if applied to this analysis. The implied warranty advocated in this analysis retains an element of fault. 2 4 Implied warranty would be a more precise title.
TOWARD AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF RESULTS IN

SERVICE TRANSACTIONS-THE THEORY

The following sections set out the implied warranties of results.
Each element of the warranties will be analyzed and explained in
these sections. There are two warranties which differ in only one
respect: the measure by which the results achieved by a service are
compared with the results warranted. 25 Two warranties are necessitated because of the importance of differentiating between types
of service transactions. Traditionally, most authorities have ana-

lyzed services without recognizing these major distinctions. This
failure to categorize services may be one of the reasons why so few
services have been held to involve implied warranties of results.
Four categories of service transactions are developed later in this
analysis. Recognition of the analytical distinctions between the services in each category will facilitate the application of an implied
warranty of results to each service.
The implied warranties reject customary or industry standards
in determining liability. Instead, the standard of liability allows a
focus on consumer expectations of results from services procured
and, at the same time, distinguishes between those results that can
be accomplished and those that cannot. The outcome in terms of
122. The authors of the doctrine specifically eliminated the application of disclaimers to
strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m.
123. See text accompanyig notes 222-31 infra.
124. To allow for the complexity factor in providing a service, some notion of fault must

be retained. Thus, a service-provider will not be liable for the failure to achieve a result if
there was no knowledge or technique available to enable him to achieve the result.
125. As will be demonstrated, one warranty measures the quality of a service by examining the performance of a product before and after servicing. The other warranty measures
the quality of a service by looking to other expected results. The warranties are mutually
exclusive in application. Only one will apply to a given service transaction.
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warranted results should directly reflect the extent of control a service-provider has over achievement of expected results. In the
analysis that follows, this complexity factor plays a central role in
determining the existence and scope of the implied warranty in
each individual service transaction.
A CONSUMER WHO HAS BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED
BY THE PROCUREMENT OF A SERVICE WHICH IS THE
PRODUCING CAUSE OF A PRODUCT PERFORMANCE IN
VIOLATION OF HIS REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS MAY
RECOVER FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY IF
THERE WAS AVAILABLE TO THE SERVICE-PROVIDER A
TECHNIQUE OR KNOWLEDGE SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH THE EXPECTED PRODUCT PERFORMANCE.
A CONSUMER WHO HAS BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED
BY THE PROCUREMENT OF A SERVICE WHICH IS THE
PRODUCING CAUSE OF A FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A RESULT REASONABLY EXPECTED BY THE CONSUMER
MAY RECOVER FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY IF
THERE WAS AVAILABLE TO THE SERVICE-PROVIDER A
TECHNIQUE OR KNOWLEDGE SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH THE RESULT.
These paragraphs embody the service transaction equivalent to
the Uniforn Commercial Code's implied warranty of the
merchantability of goods.12 6 The first warranty is created to apply
to service transactions in category one, due to their special nature
which allows them to be analyzed for quality in terms of product
performance. 2 7 The second warranty is created to apply to service
transactions falling into categories two, three and four. 8
The warranties, as set out above, are not worded affirmatively.
They do not say what the service-provider is warranting. Instead
they talk in terms of when the implied warranty is breached. They
are worded in this fashion to incorporate into one phrase all the
elements deemed necessary by this article to secure effective consumer protection.
What is actually being warranted can be expressed as follows:
UPON THE PROCUREMENT OF A SERVICE BY A
CONSUMER THE SERVICE-PROVIDER IMPLIEDLY WAR126. The warranty of the merchantability of goods is located in section 2-314 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
127. See text accompanying notes 154-71 infra.
128. See text accompanying notes 172-215 infra for application of this warranty.
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RANTS THAT HE WILL UTILIZE ALL THE TECHNIQUES
AND KNOWLEDGE AVAILABLE TO HIM IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE THE [PRODUCT PERFORMANCE] REASONABLY EXPECTED BY THE CONSUMER.
These warranties impose a standard of quality consonant with consumer-tort principles. 12 9 The scope of their application is derived
from these principles. Thus, they should always be subject to a liberal interpretation in effecting consumer protection policy and, except to the extent indicated in a later section,1 s0 they should not be
waivable by contract. The following sections analyze the warranties
element by element. After the elements of the warranties are analyzed, the four categories of services will be developed and various
applications of an implied warranty of results will be
demonstrated.
A Consumer...
The warranties are intended to be implied only in transactions
involving the procurement of services by a consumer. However, a
broadening of the traditional notion of a "consumer" is necessary
to achieve maximum justice. Application of the implied warranty
should be flexible enough to extend to all purchasers of services to
whom consumer protection principles logically apply. The scope of
this logical application would extend beyond the standard notion
of a consumer as one who purchases "for personal, family or household purposes.""
Application of the implied warranties should be a question of
law determined on a case-by-case basis. In determining which service transactions are to be subject to an implied warranty of results, factors such as the relative amount of bargaining power, the
amount of information possessed by the purchaser about the service and its attendant risks and messages of competence imparted
by the service-provider should be considered. In no case should a
purchaser of services who fits within the standard definition be denied implied warranty protection. In many cases, however, pur129. These principles are dealt with individually in most of the remaining sections of
this article.
130. See text accompanying notes 220-27 infra.
131. This narrow definition of the term consumer recurs in many statutes, such as the
UCC § 9-109(1) and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301(3) (1975). However, a much broader definition of the term consumer has been promulgated by the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §
17.45(4) (1977).

19801

Consumer Service Transactions

chasers of services falling outside this definition, such as business
purchasers, also should be accorded such protection." 2
In transactions that are adjudged not to be consumer transactions, the implied warranties can still be utilized by the courts to
promote commercial stability.3 3 On a basis similar to that of the
Uniform Commercial Code, it is suggested that in these situations
the warranties be subject to full disclaimers.
.. . Who Has Been Adversely Affected...
The term "adversely affected" is derived from statutes. 3 4 Its

basic function is to resolve questions of standing to sue on a policy
basis. Both Congress and state legislatures have utilized the test of
adverse effect, and it provides a sound basis upon which to resolve
questions of standing in consumer service transactions. Courts
should follow this legislative lead and extend application of the
test to implied warranty cases.
A consumer is adversely affected by a breach of implied warranty when he: (1) suffers an injury in fact which (2) is within the
zone of interests to be protected by the implied warranty doctrine. "' The Supreme Court of the United States in another context indicated that the adverse effect test is to be construed in a
liberal fashion to promote the policies underlying the statute in
which it is included. " 6 Therefore, it should not be unreasonable to
give a liberal construction to the test for adverse effect in promoting consumer protection policies under the implied warranty
doctrine.
Liberal use of the adverse effect test would aid courts in eliminating unrealistic and artificial barriers to consumer compensation.
Possibly the most important effect would be elimination of the
privity defense. This defense denies to consumers any recovery
against persons with whom they have not dealt directly. 3 7 The
privity defense has been characterized by some as a barrier to justice.1 38 The privity defense has been completely eliminated, or nar132. Comment, What Price Nobility?, supra note 3, at 312-13.
133. This is a primary function of the implied warranty of merchantability as applied to
non-consumer commercial transactions.
134. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (1976); Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (1977).
135. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
136. Id.
137. W. PROSSER, supra note 55, § 96 at 641 -(1971).
138. Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81-83 (Tex. 1977).
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rowly circumscribed, in consumer product transactions. " 9 A liberal
use of the adverse effect test should accomplish the same result in
service transactions. This would recognize the consumer-tort principle that harm resulting from breach of an implied warranty
should be recoverable without regard to privity or the lack of privity. The focus should be, as the Supreme Court has held, on the
"interests infringed."1 40 Thus, when a consumer is damaged after
purchasing a defective product in reliance on the assurances of a
product testing service published in a magazine, the consumer
should be allowed to prove a cause of action against both the product tester and the magazine. The fact that no fee was paid by the
consumer to the testing service or that someone else purchased the
magazine should not as a matter of law bar a recovery by the
consumer.
Using the test for adverse effect could also eliminate unrealistic
distinctions that have been drawn by courts between various services. For example, by looking to the zone of interests protected by
the implied warranty doctrine, it should become irrelevant whether
a service is denominated "professional" or "non-professional." The
adverse affect test would allow judicial analysis of the true issue in
a consumer service transaction: whether or not a warranty of results is justified in a particular service transaction. The focus
would be on controlling issues, free from the distraction of meaningless distinctions.
Finally, the test for adverse effect would allow, when justified, a
broadening of the range of damages for which a consumer is allowed to sue. In determining the extent of adverse effect from
damage to the environment, the United States Supreme Court
held that the interests protected "at times may reflect 'aesthetic,
conservational and recreational' as well as economic values."14 1 A
similar broad zone of protection should be available to consumers.
This interpretation of adverse effect has already been sanctioned
by the Texas Supreme Court to the extent of allowing recoveries
for mental anguish apart from personal, property or economic
1 42
damages.
. . . By the Procurement of a Service . . .
The implied warranty should arise upon the procurement of a
139.
140.
141.
142.

See text accompanying notes 71-90 supra.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
Id. at 734.
Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. 1977).

1980]

Consumer Service Transactions

service by a consumer. To apply this element, it is necessary to
determine what commercial circumstances are required in order
for a service to be procured. This has particular relevance in regard
to two applications of the implied warranty doctrine: to services
rendered without a fee and to services rendered by persons not in
the business of rendering the service.
In the vast majority of cases, the service will be provided at a
cost to the consumer. This should not, however, preclude application of implied warranty to some services rendered without a fee,
when a court determines the warranty should apply as a matter of
policy. Some services are rendered gratuitously as a preliminary to
services with a cost. The factor of consumer reliance and the effect
of representations of service-provider competence may be as great
in the preliminary services as in others. Thus, damages resulting
from the "free towing service" offered by an automobile repair garage should be recoverable under the implied warranty doctrine.
Similarly, errors in the diagnosis called a "free estimate" by product repair businesses should be subject to implied warranty if the
circumstances so warrant. Furthermore, the fact that a consumer
did not procure any services that follow from the preliminary services should not, as a rule, bar recovery. As with the determination
of who is to be deemed a consumer, the application of implied warranty to services rendered without charge should be made when a
court determines consumer protection policy logically applies to
the facts of the case. The flexibility of a case-by-case approach will
allow the most just application of the implied warranty doctrine.
The case-by-case approach should also be used when persons
render services for a fee in isolated transactions. In most cases,
persons not in the business of supplying the services should not be
held to impliedly warrant results, because the redistributive policies underlying the implied warranty doctrine usually will not apply to persons who are not in the business of rendering such services. Prior to determining, however, that an isolated service was
rendered without an implied warranty, a court should weigh other
consumer protection factors. The policy of protecting human life,
health and safety may outweigh the lack of a redistributive basis
for implying warranties. Relevant facts might include the extent of
consumer reliance involved in the transaction, relative bargaining
positions and the general representational context surrounding the
transaction, including the messages of competence communicated
by the service-provider to the consumer. This flexible approach
would recognize that consumer expectations for results will not al-
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ways differentiate between a service-provider regularly in the business and one involved in an isolated transaction.4 s For example,
an implied warranty may be appropriate in a case when the service
is provided by a person in a business involving.other products or
services. Application of implied warranty to isolated service transactions should proceed on a case-by-case basis.
. . . Which Is a Producing Cause...
"Producing cause" has become the prevailing standard of legal
causation in Texas consumer transactions1 44 and it is appropriate
for the implied warranty in service transactions. Producing cause is
defined as "an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which in a
natural sequence, produced injuries or damages complained of, if
any.,, 145 The substitution of producing cause for proximate cause
reflects the move away from negligence to liability without fault in
consumer trnnsactions. 4 When liability without fault is imposed,
traditional tort notions of causation become improper. Thus, intent, knowledge and foreseeability should not play a part in deter1 47
mining legal causation in an implied warranty case.
. . . Of a Product Performance In Violation of His Reasonable
Expectations.
There are two logical limitations on the range of consumer expectations for results that are to be granted legal protection. One
limitation requires that protection be extended only to those results that can be achieved by the service-provider. That limitation
143. This flexible approach is preferred to the traditional categorical approach taken by
the UCC and strict products liability. The UCC warranty of merchantability in § 2-314
applies only to
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in
the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed....
U.C.C. § 2-104(1). Similarly, comment f to § 402A limits strict liability to "any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption."
144. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1976).
145. Id. The court also stated that there can be more than one producing cause.
146. The implied warranty of results advocated in this article retains a notion of fault,
unlike strict products liability. However, this is done only to allow a practical application of
implied warranty to service transactions. The focus of this warranty standard is on results
and not the standard of care. The negligence-foreseeability limitations on liability are rejected for a higher standard of liability. Thus, producing cause and not proximate cause
should be the legal test for causation in service transactions involving the implied warranty
of results.
147. C.A. Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W. 2d 596, 598 (Tex. 1969).
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will be taken up in the next section.. 8 The second limitation requires that of all consumer expectations for results, only those that
are reasonable should be accorded protection. This section analyzes the latter limitation on expectations for results, that of
reasonableness.
The test for reasonable expectations should take into account
the entire representational context surrounding the service transaction. This includes, to the extent possible, determining what
promises, assurances, messages and images were present during the
transactional period that were likely to have caused the development of expectations in the consumer.14 9 The court should view the
transaction from the point of view of the consumer, thereby reflecting the one-way flow of information from service-provider to
consumer. 15 0 Those expectations of result that would objectively be
expected by a consumer in light of the representational context
should be deemed reasonable.
Application of the test for the reasonableness of consumer expectations will necessarily require the development of an objective
standard against which the expectations of individual consumers
will be compared. It is important that this standard not set a level
of intelligence or care so high that it would deny protection to the
uneducated or gullible. Unless the circumstances clearly warrant a
different conclusion, the test for the reasonableness of expectations
should protect those expectations for results that would be held by
"the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous." Thus, a jury
should be warranted in finding that a consumer reasonably expected that his mechanic would install a rebuilt carburetor in his
car in a manner that would not cause an accident (keeping in mind
that the limitation dealt with here is one of reasonably expected
results, not achievable results). It would probably not be reasonable for the consumer to expect his four cylinder engine to suddenly perform like an eight cylinder. Similarly, a consumer would
be reasonable in expecting the installation of a solar heating system in his home to result in an adequate supply of heat, but he
would not necessarily be reasonable in expecting his heating bill to
be cut in half.
148.

See text accompanying notes 147-49 infra.

149.

See text accompanying notes 9-26 supra.

150.

See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
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If There Was Available To the Service-Provider a

Technique
Or Knowledge Sufficient To Accomplish the Expected Product
.Performance
This section illustrates the last element necessary for recovery. It
provides a second limitation of consumer expectations: the consumer must prove the expected result was achievable. This element represents the heart and substance of the service-provider's
warranty. He impliedly warrants that in providing the service he
will utilize all the knowledge and techniques available to him to
achieve reasonably expected results. If the consumer can prove
that the failure to achieve a reasonably expected result was accompanied by the service-provider's failure to utilize all knowledge or
techniques that might have accomplished the result, this element
will be satisfied.
By incorporating this element, the implied warranty advocated
by this article does not represent "liability without fault". Rather,
it tempers a result-oriented focus with a type of fault analysis. It is
impossible to allow for the complexity factor involved in providing
a service and still retain a fully result-oriented focus. The negligence standard, however, should no longer provide the measure of
fault. It should not matter whether the technique or knowledge not
utilized was reasonably overlooked. The test for fault should focus
only upon whether it was available to the service-provider. As a
corollary, it should not matter whether the technique or knowledge
was utilized by 95% or just 5% of all service-providers in the industry. What should matter is availability. The existence of a technique or knowledge which may accomplish a reasonably expected
result allows the law, as a matter of consumer protection policy, to
presume that it will be utilized. 51 In virtually all cases, existence
of the available technique or knowledge should be a jury question.
This shifting of the standard of liability is justified as a judicial
response to the inability of consumers to protect their interests in
service transactions. No longer would a service-provider be required only to use reasonable care. He would now be required to be
as accurate in providing a service as contemporary knowledge in
151. This element sets a standard which requires the service-provider to provide the best
service that he can, in the light of available techniques and knowledge. Thus, the test for
implied warranty replaces industry custom with this higher standard. The importance of
consumer protection policy lays the foundation for this alteration in the standard of liability..See text accompanying notes 97-109 supra.
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the industry allowed. This element would encourage service-providers to focus their attention on expected results instead of on reasonable care, thus promoting disclosures to the consumer in the
result-oriented terms which lead consumers to procure services.
This element also would encourage service-providers to keep
abreast of the latest discoveries and advances in knowledge within
their industry.
The most significant feature of this element is that it allows the
range of results impliedly warranted by a service-provider to narrow as the number of variables outside his control increases. This
accounting for complexity can be illustrated by application of the
implied warranty to three services commonly provided by attorneys. Ranging in descending order of complexity, they are: litigating a case; drafting a will; and rendering an abstract of title. A
consumer's reasonable expectations for results from the services
would include, respectively: a victorious outcome to the litigation;
an orderly transfer of property to intended beneficiaries; and an
accurate appraisal of the extent to which title is clouded.
The practice of litigation involves many variables beyond the
control of an attorney. The most obvious involve unpredictable
jury findings and court rulings. Although the attorney has a direct
influence on how these result, it can hardly be said that there is a
technique or knowledge available in the legal industry that might
assure beforehand that litigation will be victorious. 152 Although it
would be a question for the jury, it is hard to imagine an attorney
being held to impliedly warrant a positive outcome to litigation.
The flexibility of this element, however, would allow a jury to find,
for example, that a more specific implied warranty was made by
the attorney that he would utilize all available theories of recovery
153
in attempting to be victorious in litigation.
The drafting of a will involves less variables beyond the control
of an attorney. Some of the variables involve complying with the
rules against perpetuities and restraints on alienation, fulfilling the
elements of testamentary capacity and intent, procuring a sufficient number of qualified witnesses and meeting all the procedural
requirements of the probate court. Although many wills fail to

152. One commentary suggests that the complexity in litigation and other services such
as medical treatment may be overstated. Comment, Extending Implied Warranties, supra
note 28, at 405.
153. For example, a jury might find that an attorney impliedly warranted he would utilize all available theories of recovery in an attempt to prevail in court.
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achieve the intended result of passing property to the specified
beneficiaries, it is not difficult to imagine a jury finding an implied
warranty that this result will be accomplished. An attorney is usually not pressed for time in drawing a will. He has all the comforts
of his office including form books. He has time to confer with a
local expert if he runs into a problem not covered by the form
book. Furthermore, as complex as the rule against perpetuities is,
it can hardly be said that there is not sufficient knowledge in the
legal industry to assure compliance with the rule. Such a warranty
would not be unjust in light of the specificity of results intended
by the parties and the message of competence imparted to a consumer by a person calling himself an "attorney." Of course, a jury
finding of implied warranty is not automatic. If the result could
not be achieved, no warranty would be implied.
In regard to abstracting of titles, to the extent that this involves
merely checking the record files, there is virtually no variable affecting results beyond the control of the attorney. Thus, it would
be rare that an attorney did not impliedly warrant the accuracy of
an abstract of title.
Other examples of service transactions further illustrate the operation of the complexity factor. Since knowledge exists to accurately perform most automobile repair services, implied warranties
in such transactions will be found frequently by juries. In comparison, it will likely be rare that a doctor impliedly warrants a cure
from medical treatment, because the variable of individual patient
reaction to medical treatment is likely to be beyond the comprehension of the medical industry. It cannot be said, however, that
knowledge of the range of available forms of treatment is nonexistent. Thus, in most cases, a doctor should be held to impliedly
warrant his utilization of all available treatments to accomplish a
cure.
To prove this element, the consumer would introduce evidence
showing that at the time the service was provided it was possible
to achieve the result reasonably expected. This evidence could be a
specific available technique which was not utilized or a more general failure to use available knowledge. For example, the failure of
a doctor to accurately diagnose a disease in his patient could be
linked to either the doctor's failure to use a particular available
test or to his general failure to recognize the condition from test
data. Similarly, the failure of a mechanic to accurately install a
carburetor could be linked to his failure to use an available technique for testing its installation or to a failure to attach a neces-

1980]

Consumer Service Transactions

sary wire. A jury finding that the disease could have been accurately diagnosed or that the carburetor could have been accurately
installed would, in conjunction with the other required elements,
justify a recovery of damages.
TOWARD AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF RESULTS IN
SERVICE TRANSACTIONS-APPLICATION

To facilitate application of implied warranties, the following sections present a categorization of service transactions on the basis
of their controlling characteristics. The implied warranty of "product performance" is created especially to apply to category one service transactions. The other categories do not focus on product
performance, but rather on a result or results reasonably expected
from the service. It should be noted, however, that the four categories do not represent hard and fast analytical differences.
Category One Services
Category one services can be measured for quality in terms of
the performance of the product into which they are incorporated.
The service, in effect, becomes the product. Category one services
include automobile and other product repair services, product
modification services such as waterproofing and chroming, and
other services which derive a function in relation to some
previ64
services.
product-testing
as
such
ously existing product,
The services in this category, unlike those in the remaining three
categories, carry a difficult burden of proving causation of injury or
loss. This difficult burden results because category one services are
integrated into and actually become part of an already existing
product. Thus, it is not sufficient merely to prove that product performance in violation of reasonable consumer expectations resulted
after the product was serviced. The violation of expectations
caused by poor product performance must be linked causally to the
failure of the service-provider to utilize knowledge or a technique
sufficient to result in adequate product performance.
Measuring consumer expectations by the performance of a product is not new. The Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A measure quality in consumer product
transactions in terms of product performance. The UCC requires
154. This article takes an expanded and untraditional view of what a "product" is. See
text accompanying notes 172-92 infra. As will be seen, not all products can be brought to
the service-provider.
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that a product be at least "fit for the ordinary purposes." 15 Section 402A requires that a product not perform so as to violate the
expectations of the ordinary consumer.'" Both reject the negligence standard with its focus on the customs and ordinary care
within an industry.
By utilizing product performance tests, both the UCC and Section 402A have laid the groundwork for measuring the quality of
all product-related services by the resulting product performance.
These two promulgations have already substituted a product performance test in place of negligence for many services. Because of
the interwoven relationship of services and products, it was impossible for the UCC and Section 402A to eliminate negligence from
the product standard of liability without affecting the standard applied. to services. All the services that go into a product prior to its
sale, designing, manufacturing, transporting, preparation for sale,
etc., are currently measured for quality in terms of product performance. Similarly, any post-sale services provided by the product
seller in order to keep the product merchantable are currently
measured for quality by the product's performance.Thus, the test
for service quality proposed in category one is not new. It merely
represents an extension of a standard already applied by the UCC
and Section 402A to many product-related services.
Several cases indicate that a product performance test for services has already been accepted by some courts. In Realmutto v.
Straub Motors, Inc.,L7 the defendant, a used car dealer, improperly installed a rebuilt carburetor in the plaintiff's car. The carburetor, as installed, caused uncontrollable acceleration resulting in
an accident. Citing the policy basis for strict liability the court
held:
[W]e are of the view that a used car dealer ought to be subject to
strict liability in tort with respect to a mishap resulting from any
defective work, repairs or replacement he has done or made on
the vehicle before the sale .... L
Another case involving similar facts reached a similar result by the

155. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314(2)(c).
156. Strict products liability applies when a product is sold "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Section
402A, comment g.
157. 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974).
158. Id. at 344-45, 322 A.2d 440.
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use of implied warranty. 1 9 In a case involving the defective repair
of a grinding wheel, the court cited policy factors as the basis for
allowing a strict liability instruction.1 60 The court eventually applied strict liability on traditional product liability grounds. It recognized, however, the broader issue regarding application of strict
liability to repairs and suggested its viability on policy grounds.",
The heavy reliance placed on policy by these courts is justifiable
in view of the consumer's inability to protect his interests in service transactions. Application of the implied warranty test suggested in this article, however, need not be based wholly on policy
because fault is not completely eliminated from the test.
The implied warranty test can be illustrated by its application to
the facts in the Realmutto case cited above.' 62 There should be no
issue over the violation of reasonable consumer expectations in
Realmutto. It is normal for a consumer to expect services to be
performed on his car so as not to render it unsafe to drive. Furthermore, this violation of reasonable expectations led to an adverse effect on the consumer and damage to himself and his automobile. The most difficult element for the consumer to establish
would most likely be producing cause. The consumer would have
to secure a finding that the installation of the carburetor was "an
efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which in a natural sequence produced" the violation of his reasonable expectations.1 63
Then, he would recover his damages if he could establish that
there was available to the mechanic a technique or knowledge sufficient to allow accurate installation of the carburetor.
A fact situation involving only economic loss arose in the case of
Aegis Productions Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America. ' In that
case, the plaintiff alleged breach of implied warranty for the failure
to properly repair a camera. The defendant diagnosed the cause of
the camera's poor performance to be a defective timing device. After several attempts at repairing the camera, the defendant assured
the consumer that his camera was repaired. It was unfortunate for
the consumer that the timing device only appeared to be synchro-

159. Woodrick v. Smith Gas Serv., Inc., 87 Il. App. 2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967).
160. Young v. Aro Corp., 36 Cal. App. 3d 240, 111 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1973).
161. Id. at 246-47, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39.L
162. See notes 155-56 supra.
163. Since the focus of the implied warranty of results is on reasonable consumer expectations, the test for producing cause inquires whether rendition of the service caused a violation of reasonable expectations, not whether it caused the injuries.
164. 25 A.D. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (1966).
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nized. His pictures continued to be spoiled by the camera after being repaired. In court, the consumer was unable to prove negligence by the defendant in providing the repair service. Citing the
traditional rule that implied warranties do not apply to services
the court denied recovery of the service fees.
Under the analysis proposed here, the result might have been a
recovery for the consumer. Of the range of consumer expectations
connected with the operation of a camera, one of the most basic is
that it will take acceptable quality photographs. Therefore, such
an expectation should be found reasonable. If the plaintiff could
prove that the defective timing device was the cause of poor camera performance, the failure to repair this device adequately would
be the producing cause of the violation of the consumer's reasonable expectations. Finally, if the consumer could prove that sufficient knowledge was available to the service-provider to enable
him both to determine that the timing device was the cause of poor
pictures and to repair the device, a prima facie case for breach of
warranty would have been established.
A service component analysis can facilitate application of implied warranty to product performance situations such as that in
Aegis. "65
' Most, but not all, of the services in category one contain
three components.' 6" A defect can exist in one or more of the components. The first component involves analysis of the problem to
ascertain its cause. Thus, if a consumer's car pulls to the left when
the brakes are applied, a mechanic hired to correct the problem
will first be required to determine what causes the car to pull to
the left. If the mechanic determines that the cause is a worn brake
lining he must then select or fabricate a solution to the problem.
This constitutes the second component of the service. The most
logical solution would be to replace the brake lining, but if it is
possible to cure the problem with some minor adjustment this
would represent an alternative solution. The third component involves application of the solution, i.e., replacing the brake lining or
making the adjustment. If the car continued to pull to the left after servicing and this caused an accident, the consumer would have
to causally link one or more of these service components to the
accident to satisfy the producing cause. element. The consumer
could causally link the accident to a defect in the first component
165. The component analsysis was developed in Greenfield, supra note 19, at 697.
166. This component analysis can also extend outside of category one to include, for
example, medical services. See text accompanying note 216 infra.
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of the service by proving that the real source of the pulling to the
left was a bent frame. Causation to service component two would
be established if, instead of replacing the defective brake lining,
the mechanic mistakenly assumed a minor adjustment would suffice. Causation to service component three would be established if
it were proved that the wrong-sized brake lining was installed.
Once the consumer causally linked a defective service component to the violation of his reasonable expectations for product
performance, a prima facie case could be established upon proof
that a technique or-knowledge was available that would have enabled that component of the service to be rendered accurately. The
technique or knowledge element would be satisfied with regard to
component one if it were possible to determine that the cause of
the problem was a bent frame even though 95% of the time the
cause is a worn brake lining. The element would be satisfied regarding component two if it were possible to determine that a minor adjustment would be inadequate even though virtually all
mechanics would make the minor adjustment. The element would
be satisfied regarding component three if it were possible to select
the correct-sized lining, regardless of ordinary care.
The case of McCool v. Hoover Equip. Co.,1 67 represents a variation in the type of service that can be measured by a product performance warranty. The plaintiff in that case was in the business
of selling second-hand crankshafts. The defendant was in the business of chroming used crankshafts and was hired by the plaintiff to
apply chrome to several of the plaintiff's crankshafts. After the
chroming service was completed all of the crankshafts failed in
short order. In his complaint the plaintiff did not allege negligence.
The court found for the plaintiff nonetheless, holding that there
was no reason for implied warranties to be limited to the sale of
goods."" The court emphasized the plaintiff's necessary reliance on
the defendant and the defendant's representations of competence,
factors which suggest the appropriateness of a product performance warranty.1 69 It appears from the facts that an improper application of chrome was the producing cause of the failure of the
crankshafts to perform as reasonably expected by the consumer. If
the consumer was able to prove that there was available to the defendant some technique for applying chrome to this type of crank-

167.
168.
169.

415 P.2d 954 (Okla. 1966).
Id. at 958.
Id. at 958-9.
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shaft without causing it to malfunction,17 there would be no reason to deny a recovery of damages to the consumer. In light of the
lack of complexity involved in many service transactions, such as
in the McCool case, consumer recoveries should not be difficult in
such cases absent unusual circumstances.
Finally, the case of Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 1 serves to
demonstrate another possible application of the product performance warranty. In that case, the defendant supplied the services of
testing products for quality and certifying those of high quality. As
publisher of Good Housekeeping magazine, the defendant had a
good reputation for competence in evaluating the quality of products. If the facts of that case had been that the defendant's product certification was the inducement for a consumer purchasing a
defective product, the implied warranty doctrine might provide a
remedy to the consumer. The element for adverse effect would entail examination of the interests protected and ignore any lack of
privity between the consumer and the product certifier. Similarly,
recovery would not be barred due to the lack of a fee paid by the
consumer to the product certifier. It would be irrelevant who
bought the magazine containing the product description as long as
the plaintiff was able to establish that the defendant's certifying
service was the producing cause of the purchase. If the consumer
could prove that there was a method of testing available that
would have exposed the defect, recovery would be allowed.
Because of the product-related nature of the services in category
one, the measure of product performance provides a logical basis
for the application to these services of implied warranty. The test
already applied by the UCC and Section 402A of the Restatement
can be expanded in logical fashion to cover all the services in category one. The warranty, as set out in this section, comports with
consumer protection policy and provides better protection for consumer expectations than the negligence doctrine.
Category Two Services
The services in category two are those which result in the functional equivalent of a "product." As contemplated by this analysis,
the term "product" denotes a creation with specific functions
which can be measured in terms of consumer expectations. The
170. Of course, if there was no such technique available, the failure to make this disclosure would constitute a deceptive trade practice. See text accompanying notes 267-68 infra.
171. 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
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controlling question in evaluating category two services is: How
well does the product perform its intended functions? It is also
central to this category of services that the term "product" be expanded, beyond traditional notions of what a product is, to include
all creations with specific intended functions.
Included in this category are services resulting in "products"
such as homes, heating systems, photographs, rain gutters, septic
tanks, paint jobs, wills, architectural plans and specifications, IRS
tax returns (prepared for a fee), contracts and title abstracts.
These products are created by the service-provider to perform
functions which "are mutually known and intended" by the parties
to the transaction. Thus, a heating system is created to provide
adequate heat; a photograph is produced to adequately recreate a
visual scene on paper; a will is created to effect the orderly transfer
of a person's property at his death; and a title abstract is created
to exhibit the extent of encumbrances upon a piece of property.
These services are unlike category one services in that the latter
are incorporated into a larger product and manifest their functional value only in terms of the performance of that product.
While category one service-providers have only partial input into
an already existing and functioning product, category two serviceproviders create a new product.
As was the case with category one service transactions, the logical basis for implied warranty in category two is established by the
UCC warranty provisions and Restatement Section 402A. These
two promulgations recognize the existence of products with intended functions and measure the quality of such products by asking how well the products perform their functions. 7 Although the
term "product," as contemplated in category two is much broader
than that contemplated by the UCC warranty provisions and Section 402A, the justifications for those laws apply with the same
force to the category two analysis. It is fundamental to this category of services that by altering its focus, a court can change almost any service transaction into a product transaction. For example, the building of a home was once considered to be a service and
subject only to the negligence doctrine. Now the building of a

172. Thus, in order to comport with UCC warranty standards, cars, dishwashers, shoes
and other products must function so as to be "fit for their ordinary purposes." UCC § 2-314.
Similarly, these products must function in a manner that does not cause physical damage to
any person or property. Section 402A. It is the thesis of category two that this functional
analysis can be extended to any "product" created to perform a function.
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home is considered to yield a product which is measured for quality by the implied warranty doctrine. 173 A similar shift has occured
with regard to the maintenance of rented dwellings at a level of
habitability.

174

The application of the implied warranty to a category two service can be illustrated by various transactions resulting in the installation of wiring into a dwelling. When wiring is installed in a
new home prior to sale, the wiring itself is considered to be a product. 175 It has various functions which include providing electricity

to the various parts of the home in an efficient and safe manner. If
the wiring system fails to supply electricity or does so in a dangerous manner, it is defective and will cause a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability of the house. The quality of the wiring
system is evaluated as a product in terms of its compliance with
the inhabitants' reasonable expectations for habitability. A similar
176
view is taken of the wiring in a dwelling leased for occupancy.
Reasonable care on the part of the contractor in designing and installing the system plays no part in determining the quality of the
product. If the wiring does not perform in a manner reasonably
expected by the tenant, the tenant can recover damages for breach
of implied warranty.
On the other hand, if a contractor installs a wiring system in a
home already in existence, the system is not treated as a product,
but merely as the result of a service.1 77 The illogical result is that
the standard of care used in installing the system is the measure of
quality for the wiring. The system as a product, that is, in terms of
its expected functions, is ignored. Thus, when a consumer's home
burns down because of a faulty wiring system, implied warranty is
available in some cases but not in others. The analysis of this article extends implied warranty to include all products.
In Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 1 7 8 the court demonstrated the efficacy of an expanded product analysis. In that case,
the plaintiff-consumer contracted with the defendant to install a
173. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Greenfield, supra note 19, at 676.
174. E.g., Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
175. This is because the sale of a new home is held by most courts to entail an implied
warranty of habitability of the home and all its parts. See note 173 supra.
176. This is true in jurisdictions that recognize an implied warranty of habitability in
the rental of a dwelling. See note 174 supra.
177. Thus, implied warranty is usually not extended beyond the sale and leasing of
dwellings.
178. 55 Cal.2d 573, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
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radiant heating system in a concrete slab floor. Within several
years of installation the system became so defective that it had to
be replaced. The consumer was not able to prove that the system
was negligently installed. The only evidence introduced was that
the system did not provide the expected heat and that it was necessary to have a new system installed in its place to accomplish
that result. As a preliminary matter, the court found that the implied warranty of merchantability of the Uniform Sales Act 1" did
not apply because the contract contemplated a service for labor
and materials. 8 0 The court then held, however, that, "similar warranties may be implied in other contracts not governed by such
statutory provisions when the contracts are of such a nature that
the implication is justified."18' 1
The Aced court concluded that there was an implied warranty as
to both the workmanship and the materials aspects of the transaction and that the warranty required that the system "be fit for its
intended uses. 18 2 Thus, by focusing on the results to be achieved
by the heating system and implying a warranty covering all aspects
of the transaction, the court treated the system as a product in and
of itself. The care used by the service-provider in creating the
product was of no moment as the court concentrated on the consumer's expectations of results to be obtained from the heating
system. By extending the doctrine of implied warranty to guarantee the intended result that the heating system would heat adequately, the court in Aced was implicitly recognizing the functional
nature of that product. It recognized that the resultant heating
system could be judged by how well it performed its intended
functions, just as could a car, a bowl of soup, a permanent wave
solution or a bottle of medicine.
The warranty advocated in this article would first have asked if
the heating system performed in a manner that violated the consumer's expectations for results to be achieved by its installation.
Since the expectations in Aced were in terms of an adequate supply of heat, it would seem obvious that the expectations were violated. The reasonableness of this expectation also seems easily established, since that was the primary function for which the
system was created. No facts are apparent which would break the

179.
180.
181.
182.

This Act was the precursor of the UCC.
55 Cal.2d at 580-82, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 262, 360 P.2d at 902.
Id. at 582, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 262, 360 P.2d at 902.
Id.
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chain of causation between rendition of the service and the violation of reasonable consumer expectations. The producing cause,
thus, appears to be the installation of an inadequate system.
The final issue would be whether knowledge was available to the
service-provider that would have enabled him to design and install
a heating system that heated adequately. Since installation of
properly functioning heating systems constitutes the main purpose
of the industry, it would require the existence of an unusual set of
facts for the jury to find that achievement of the contemplated result was not within the control of the service-provider.
The term product has been expanded in Illinois to include an
automobile paint job. In Jeffreys v. Hickman,1 8 the plaintiff
brought his car to the defendant to have it painted. Within a few
months after completion, the paint began to crack and peel. The
plaintiff was not able to prove the exact cause of failure of the
paint job. Thus, he apparently was unable to prove negligence. The
court did not, however, concern itself with the care exercised in
rendering the service. Instead it took a functional approach to the
product, the resulting paint job, and held that the evidence was
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that there was an implied warranty for the accomplishment of a known purpose: a paint coat
which would be serviceable for a reasonable period of time.184 Because the service-provider failed to provide services which accomplished the mutually known intended purpose, the consumer was
able to recover damages for breach of implied warranty. Once
again, this article provides a useful framework for conceptualizing
the implied warranty. The frustration of reasonable consumer expectations for a serviceable paint job seems clear. Similarly, the
producing cause of the frustration of expectations appears to be
the procurement of the painting services. Additionally, the expectation that the paint job would retain its integrity beyond several
months seems to be reasonable. The closest question of fact concerns whether or not there was available to the painter a technique
or knowledge that would enable him to perform a paint job that
lasted beyond several months. The variables would include the climatic conditions in which the car is driven or type of paint job
purchased. The ever present salt on Chicago streets during the
winter or the hot and dry Phoenix summers would cause cracking
and peeling in a shorter time than would conditions in other parts
183.
184.

132 Il. App. 2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 110 (1971).
Id. at 272, 269 N.E.2d at 111.
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of the country. Similarly, it is possible that the automobile industry is not capable of creating a metallic paint job that lasts as long
as a standard paint job. These limitations on the painter's capabilities would be the ultimate jury consideration in determining
whether or not there existed an implied warranty that the paint
job would last beyond several months. Expansion of the term product to include other products with tangible or sensable functions
such as photographs, raingutters, septic tanks, etc., should follow
logically from the analysis presented in the foregoing paragraphs.
There are, however, other "products" to which these principles
apply which are not tangible and do not perform sensable functions. These include, for example, wills, contracts, abstracts of title
and engineering plans and specifications. These products cannot be
measured for quality by the senses as can heating systems and
paint jobs. In a manner similar to tangible products, however, they
can be analyzed for quality in terms of how well they perform their
intended functions. When there is an intangible but "mutually
known intended purpose" for a product resulting from services,
with a concommitant lack of consumer bargaining power and necessary consumer reliance on the service-provider, an implied warranty framework based on public policy is appropriate. Significantly, the consumer reliance factor may be even greater in
services resulting in non-tangible products because of the specialized training these services frequently require. Since the implied
warranty doctrine advocated here is flexible enough to allow for
any increased complexity in achieving intended results, implied
warranty should set the standard of quality for products with intangible functions.
The case of Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co.,' 88 illustrates a functional approach to an intangible product. The plaintiffs in Broyles
had hired the defendant, an incorporated group of civil engineers,
to design plans and specifications for drainage of a proposed subdivision. The complaint alleged "that the defendant, being informed
of the nature of the project and the need of civil engineering services to draw plans and specifications for adequate drainage of a
tract of land to be developed, accepted employment for the rendition of such engineering services."' 8 6 The complaint further alleged
that "the drainage areas depicted on the plans submitted by the
defendant were incorrect and did not show adequate storm drain185.
186.

275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963).
Id. at 37, 151 So.2d at 769.
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age easements where necessary" and that the plans were inadequate for their intended purpose, thus, leading to a system that
caused periodic flooding.

87

Recognizing the result-oriented focus of the complaint, the court
summed up the effect of its allegations:
Neither negligence nor the want of reasonable skill and diligence in the preparation of the plans was charged in the complaint. A breach of implied warranty of adequate results is the
gravaman of each count. Plaintiffs take the position that an implied warranty exists and it casts upon the defendant the obligation of a guarantor or insurer of the plans for the purpose in view
and of which defendant had knowledge when it accepted
employment. s
The court found the warranty to be extant and held that a right to
recovery had been alleged. 18 9 This is significant not only as a statement of judicial recognition of an implied -warranty of results in
service transactions, but also because the warranty was extended
to protect buyers who were not purchasing for "personal, family, or
household" use. 190 Furthermore, the language used left no doubt
that the court was adopting a functional product approach to the
creation of the drainage plans:
We are of the opinion that . . .the defendant impliedly war-

ranted the sufficiency and adequacy of the plans and specifications to reasonably accomplish the purpose for which they were
intended ....

We are further of the opinion that an express war-

ranty was not necessary to charge the defendant with becoming
an insurer or guarantor that such plans and specifications would
reasonably accomplish the purposes in view. 91
Stressing, in effect, both the reasonable expectations of the consumers and the understanding of the service-provider, the court
continued:
The defendant professed to be expert or held itself out to be,
and certainly was charged with notice that correct and adequate
plans and specifications were essential for adequate drainage of
rain water from the area of land to be converted. Common under187. Id.
188. Id. at 37, 151 So.2d at 769-70.
189. Id. at 38, 151 So.2d at 770.
190. Thus, this court holds that implied warranty is appropriate to business buyers of
services. See text accompanying notes 131-33 supra.
191. 275 Ala. 35, 38, 151 So.2d 767, 770 (1963).
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standing and the ordinary course of dealing would speak up and
justify a reasonable conclusion, as we view all the circumstances
and the nature of the contract, that the parties mutually intended
an agreement of guaranty as to the sufficiency and adequacy of
the plans and specifications to accomplish proper and adequate
drainage.""
The court's heavy emphasis on the specific purposes of the
plans, which were contemplated by both sides of the transaction,
parallels the approach advocated for this category of services. The
plans designed by the defendant constituted a product created
specifically to serve as blueprints for a drainage system. As the
court recognized in overruling the defendant's demurrers, leaving
the negligence doctrine as a sole remedy for recovery would frustrate the plaintiff's reasonable expectations of result. Application
of an implied warranty of results could provide protection for the
plaintiff's reasonable expectations while accounting for the complexity involved in the creation of the drainage plans. Thus, the
jury could have been able to find that the procurement of the engineering services was the producing cause of the violation of the
plaintiff's reasonable expectations for blueprints of an adequate
drainage system. If that finding had occurred, the jury would have
had to inquire whether the engineers used all available techniques
and knowledge to accomplish the reasonably expected result. Upon
a "yes" finding the plaintiff would have been able to recover his
damages.
A will that failed to operate as intended would give rise to an
analysis similar to that of Broyles. The message of competence
sent by the attorney to the consumer, the specificity of the mutually intended result, the consumer's lack of bargaining power and
necessary reliance all justify an implied warranty that the attorney
will utilize all available knowledge to assure that all property
passes as intended. When such a result is not accomplished, the
jury should be allowed to weigh the factors that might cause the
unintended result and allocate liability on that basis. It would be
important, for example, to weigh the risks of an unfriendly probate
judge against the wealth of knowledge and experience available to
an attorney drafting a will.
Extending this analysis of warranty applications, a jury might be
justified in finding that an accountant impliedly warranted that he

192.

Id. at 38, 151 So.2d at 771.
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would use all available knowledge in preparing a tax return that
utilized all available tax breaks and complied with the law; that an
attorney would create a contract sufficient to assure the proper
flow of consideration; that a title company would prepare an abstract that would indicate all clouds on title; and that a termite
inspector would issue a document accurately reflecting the extent
of termite infestation in a home. Expansion of the term "product"
to include all services resulting in a creation with a mutually intended function is logical and just. It is the functional aspect of
each product in this category which facilitates an implied warranty
analysis. Unless the jury were to find that the failure of a product
to achieve its mutually intended purposes was caused by factors
beyond the control of the service-provider, the damaged consumer
should be allowed to recover his damages.
Category Three Services
The services in this category and the next do not become incorporated into a product, nor do they result in a functionally independent product. Categories three and four thus include all the
services that are not grouped in categories one and two. Categories
three and four could be combined into one category. They are,
however, kept separate in this analysis for two reasons. First,
courts have developed a distinction between services deemed
"mechanical" or "administrative" and those deemed "judgmental. '193 In this analysis, most of the former are in category three,
most of the latter in category four. Second, the move from category
three through category four illustrates a spectrum upon which the
complexity factor increases. One of the main purposes of this article is to develop a test for implied warranty that allows for the
complexity factor; separating the categories allows this flexibility
to be emphasized.
Category three includes services that tend to be mechanical and
administrative.'" As a result, courts may be more willing to use

193. Id. at 38-39, 151 So.2d at 771-72. Services such as those performed by lawyers and
doctors tend to be viewed as complex, whereas some related services, such as the transfusion
of blood, are considered to be mechanical and not complex. Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem.
Hosp., 47 Ill.
2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
194. In this category, a mechanical or administrative service may include some services
performed by doctors and lawyers. A service is mechanical or uncomplex when the range of
results expected from the service is within the range of results achievable by the serviceprovider. This would include, for example, the administering of an injection by a doctor or
the filling of most cavities by a dentist.
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implied warranty in category three services than in category four.
In terms of this analysis, category three includes those services in
which the range of achievable results should be broad enough to
include most all reasonably expected results. Separation of these
services into a category of their own, however, is not an indication
that they. should be resolved as a matter of law. Except for the
occasional summary judgment, the existence and scope of implied
warranty should be questions of fact just as in the other categories.
Recognition of the mechanical nature of a service is probably
most well known in the blood transfusion cases."" Those cases usually involve the transfusion of impure blood or blood of the wrong
type into the consumer-plaintiff. One court articulated three reasons for applying strict liability to "mechanical and administrative" hospital services: (1) the serious potential consequences of
defective hospital services; (2) the inability of the layperson to control or recognize the defective service; and (3) the necessity of providing doctors with accurate and complete information.' 96 Similar
reasoning was utilized in Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hosp., 19 7 in
which it was suggested that the implied warranty doctrine might
be applicable to a fact situation in which a hospital employee mistakenly injected insulin instead of anesthesia into a patient. 9 8
A trend was noticed by the court in Mauran, indicating a judicial recognition of the lack of complexity involved in these services.
This lack of complexity is a characteristic common to all category
three services. It is unfortunate that courts have been too willing
to exclude all "professional" services from the "mechanical and administrative" grouping they have developed. In fact, a large number of legal, medical, architectural and other services are truly uncomplex and should not be exempted categorically from the
implied warranty test advocated by this article. Some of the services that fall into category three, that is, where achievable results
almost always include those reasonably expected, are as follows:
those rendered by an employment agency that merely matches opportunities with available talent; 9 9 a dentist filling cavities; a doc-

195. See Reilly v. King Co. Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246
(1971); Cuningham v. MacNeal Mem. Hosp., 47 Il. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
196. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Singal, supra
note 8, at 919.
197. 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. VT. 1970).
198. Id. at 301.
199. A jury might find, for example, that a reasonable expectation in such a case was
that if employment opportunities for a person with the consumer's talents are available, the
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tor taking blood pressure or giving a vaccination; an attorney
drafting articles of incorporation; a gardener landscaping; and an
exterminator eliminating termites. 200 A court willing to imply warranties into "mechanical" service transactions should treat similarly all services in which the number of variables beyond the control of the service-provider are few. There is almost always
sufficient knowledge available to these service-providers to achieve
the consumer's reasonable expectations for results.
Category Four Services
Most of the services in the first three categories are not excessively complex. For example, sufficient knowledge exists to enable
automobile mechanics to achieve most of the results reasonably expected by consumers. The diagnosing of automobile problems and
the application of solutions to those problems usually are not
fraught with large amounts of uncertainty in light of the
knowledge existing in the industry. Similarly, sufficient knowledge
probably exists to enable contractors to create heating systems,
paint jobs and drainage system plans that fulfill their intended
functions. A closer question is involved in the creation of a properly functioning will, although the complexity involved in achieving the orderly transfer of property to intended beneficiaries does
not appear to be great. Nor does the amount of complexity involved in assuring that a diabetic receives the prescribed dose of
insulin or that an ambulance takes a person with a certain type of
problem to a hospital equipped to handle the problem present
much of a challenge to the implied warranty doctrine.
It is within category four that the flexible implied warranty faces
its greatest challenge. Included in this category are such diverse
services as armed guard service, diagnosis and treatment of disease, auditing of business records, supplying of electricity, litigation practice, marketing services and many others. In this category,
reasonably expected results may bear no relationship to achievable
results because of the number of variables beyond the control of
the service-provider. Thus, the retention of a "defect" requirement
becomes a key policy factor. For those courts that accentuate only

agency would find them.
200. The attorney drafting articles of incorporation or the termite inspector issuing a
report on the extent of termite infestation in a structure might be put into category two.
However, the category is not important in such borderline cases because the implied warranty test applied will be the same.
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the redistributive policies behind implied warranty and strict liability, allowing recoveries in certain circumstances may be justified
even when no implied warranty has been breached. 0 1 Courts unwilling to completely eliminate the concept of "defect" need look
no further than the implied warranty test advocated here in allocating liability. The test's focus on whether information was available assumes that defendants will pay for bad results only when
good results were attainable.
A. number of authorities have encouraged courts to venture beyond traditional negligence liability in cases involving category
four services. 0 2 A small minority of courts have taken that step
and others have indicated a willingness to do so at some time in
the future.3
20 4
In Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Detroit Edison Co.,
the defendant was sued for the defective supplying of electricity
which caused a fire destroying the plaintiff's building. The defendant argued that electricity is not a good and therefore should not
be subject to implied warranties. The Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected that distinction and held:
[T]he implied warranties, ..
should apply to the sale of services
as well as to the sale of goods. We see no reason upon which a
logical distinction can be based, especially when, as here, we are
dealing with the production and sale of a form of energy 0which
5
under certain circumstances, can be inherently dangerous.1
The court limited the scope of its decision to the sale of electricity,

201. For example, regardless of the existence of a violation of consumer expectations, a
court may find for the consumer:
As between an innocent patient and a dentist who causes injury by using a defective instrument the law should require the loss to be borne by the dentist, even if
he is not negligent ...
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 225-26, 241 A.2d 637, 639 (1968) (dissenting
opinion).
202. See Singal, supra note 8; Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Services-Will
Another Citadel Crumble?, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 298 (1977); Greenfield, supra note 19; Note,
Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of.the Uniform Commercial Code, FORDHAM L.
Ray. 447 (1971); Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions: A Policy Approach, 28 Sw.
L.J. 575 (1974); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-sales Cases, 57 COLUM.
L. REv. 653 (1957); Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 38; Note, Products and the
Professional:Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction,24 HASTINGS L.J. 111
(1972); Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly "Service" Transactions, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 580 (1970).
203. See note 98 supra.
204. 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972)..
205. Id. at 329, 196 N.W.2d at 317-18.
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prefering to extend implied warranties to service transactions on a
case-by-case basis.2 0 6 A broad foundation, however, has been established in Michigan for extension of judicial solicitude to protect
consumer expectations in service transactions. 0 7
The plaintiff lost in the Buckeye case because he was unable ,to
prove causation. If the plaintiff, however, had been able to secure a
finding that procurement of the service of providing electricity was
"an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which is a natural sequence produced" the fire destroying his building, under this implied warranty analysis he would have then been entitled to a finding from the jury on the availability of a technique or knowledge
sufficient to safely supply electricity to his building. If the jury
found that adequate means were available to safely supply electricity to the consumer's building, then a recovery would have been
appropriate.
Even in the more difficult and complex area of the rendition of
medical services, some justices have indicated a willingness to apply strict liability. In Magrine v. Spector,208 a lengthy dissent criticized the majority's refusal to apply strict liability to a dentist. In
that case, the plaintiff was injured when a needle used by the dentist broke off in her mouth. The needle broke due to a latent defect
unknown to the dentist. The dissenting justice would have held for
the plaintiff regardless of a lack of negligence:
The law of torts should seek to compensate the injured, to encourage safety practices and to distribute losses justly ....
These
objectives may be taken to express the needs of justice. In my
view these objectives are advanced by granting plaintiff an award
in this case. Dentistry as an enterprise should pay its own way.
Denying compensation is to require an injured person who bears
the loss alone to subsidize the risk-creating activities by which
others profit.2 0 '
The dissent also noted that the availability of insurance could
cushion the blow of a judgment against the dentist.
In the case of Helling v. Carey, 10 the plaintiff sued opthamologists for the failure to diagnose and treat a glaucoma condition
206. Id. at 330, 196 N.W.2d at 318.
207. At least two courts have followed Buckeye: Insurance Co. of North America v. Radiant Elec. Co., 55 Mich. App. 410, 222 N.W.2d 323 (1974) and Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co. of
Ill. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 638, 306 N.E.2d 337 (1973).
208. 100 N.J. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968).
209. Id. at 240-41, 241 A.2d at 646-47.
210. 83 Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981.
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which eventually resulted in her blindness The plaintiff contended
that, despite her young age, the defendants were negligent in failing to give her a pressure test by which the condition could have
been discovered. The defendants argued that the standard of the
profession, which does not require the giving of a routine pressure
test to persons under the age of forty, was adequate to insulate
them from liability for negligence. The court held that "there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will
not excuse their omission."'"
The court found as a matter of law that the defendants were
negligent despite the uncontradicted evidence of the industry standard regarding pressure tests. Thus, although a negligence standard was applied it was not the traditional negligence standard. It
fell somewhere between negligence and implied warranty. A concurring judge recognized this and declared that the facts of the
case justified
a finding of liability without fault, or strict
12
liability.
Although the court's opinion used negligence terms, the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in Helling parallels that of
the implied warranty test of this article. The plaintiffs expectation
engendered by the defendants' representations of competence, was
that any serious eye diseases she had would be diagnosed by the
defendants. Accurate diagnosis of serious eye disease is a logical
purpose for which the services of an opthamologist are procured
and would therefore constitute a reasonable expectation on the
part of the consumer. The failure of the defendants to diagnose the
condition was a violation of the consumer's reasonable expectations. Furthermore, the consumer offered uncontradicted proof
that there was available to the defendants a test which would have
enabled them to diagnose the condition. Their failure to use the
pressure test was the producing cause of the violation of her reasonable expectations. Under the implied warranty analysis, the
consumer would likely have been entitled to a summary judgment
for the opthamologists' breach of an implied warranty.
The outcome would be no different if the pressure test had been
utilized by or known to only five percent of all opthamologists, so
long as the technique was available to the defendants. It is important to keep notions of foreseeability out of the test for availability. The test should not be what a service-provider should have
211.
212.

Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
Id. at 521, 519 P.2d at 984-85.
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known was available to him but what in fact was available to him.
Similarly, the outcome should be no different even if the pressure
test was able to diagnose glaucoma only in five percent of all cases.
The focus of implied warranty should not be .in terms of general
acceptance of a technique in the industry, for that approximates a
negligence standard. If it is possible that the pressure test would
disclose the existence of glaucoma in any case, the opthamologist
should impliedly warrant that he will try it. Such application of
implied warranty would force doctors to fully evaluate all available
techniques and come to an individual decision as to the value of
each. The doctor's decision not to use a technique on a patient
would only be justified if there was no possibility that it could aid
in diagnosis.
An analytical distinction should be made between cases in which
a doctor fails to diagnose and those in which he fails to cure.sls
The shortcoming in the Helling case was a failure to diagnose accurately a condition. It is possible, however, for a doctor to diagnose a condition adequately but fail to treat it properly. Consumers of medical services have reasonable expectations that their
conditions will be accurately diagnosed and that once a condition
is diagnosed, a cure will be effected. Unlike diagnosis of some diseases, the treatment of virtually all diseases is fraught with great
uncertainty and medical science is frequently unable to comprehend the varied reactions of different patients to particular courses
of treatment. Thus, a finding of an implied warranty of cure should
be a good deal more rare than a finding of an implied warranty of
accurate diagnosis. Although the extent of medical knowledge may
not justify a warranty of cure in many cases, there is, in effect, a
"sub"-implied warranty available to offer some protection for the
consumer's expectation of cure. Thus, a jury could find that a doctor impliedly warranted to utilize all available drugs, medicines,
devices and other forms of treatment in an attempt to cure his
patient. For example, if a disease has three available forms of
treatment that have resulted in cures in the past, a doctor will impliedly warrant to utilize all three treatments in an attempt to cure
a patient with that disease. The efficacy of the order of use of the
treatments should be determined from the point of view of the
consumer's reasonable expectations. The question would be which
treatment could effect the cure with the least amount of unreason213.

See the component analysis set forth in the text accompanying notes 165-66 supra.
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able side-effects or other drawbacks, such as expense. Furthermore, any attempt to place a foreseeability limit on the doctor's
liability for the occurrence of unexpected side-effects is discouraged because that incorporates a negligence standard. As in other
cases, the question should be whether or not there was a method of
effecting a cure without causing any side-effects. In the rare case
that a treatment cures one problem but creates another more severe problem, it is clear that the consumer's reasonable expectations for result will have been violated.
The winning of litigation by an attorney will probably never by
reduced to a technique or knowledge.214 However, just as the consumer expectation of a cure of disease can include a doctor's implied warranty that he will utilize all methods of treatment, the
concept of "sub"-warranties may be helpful in the case of litigation. Thus, although an attorney cannot warrant the successful
outcome of a trial, he can be held to impliedly warrant that he will
utilize all available theories of recovery.
Although an extremely broad range of services fall into category
four, the flexible test for implied warranty can provide the standard of liability for defects in virtually all of them. Stable-keepers
would be required to utilize all available techniques and knowledge
to determine whether the horses they rented to the public were
safe to ride. The standard of liability would not be whether the
stable-keeper used reasonable care in selecting and maintaining a
safe horse but whether it was possible to determine that a particular horse was not a safe one. If the consumer can prove his reasonable expectations for a safe horse were violated by a failure of the
stable-keeper to determine that the horse was not safe, the consumer should be able to recover his damages if an accurate determination was possible. If a firm specializing in marketing new
products and services was hired by an inventor, the firm might impliedly warrant that it would secure needed patents and take advantage of all available markets for the invention. If impure water
is furnished to a consumer when it was possible to furnish pure
water there would be a breach of implied warranty.
The test for implied warranty illustrated in the previous sections
provides a result oriented standard of liability which can be tempered by practicality. Breach of warranty may occur upon the vio214. However, an implied warranty of a positive outcome at court might be made, for
example, in the case of an uncontested divorce or in an attempt to secure a default
judgment.
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lation of the consumer's reasonable expectations for result regardless of reasonable care. However, the range of impliedly warranted
results directly decreases as the number of variables outside the
control of the service-provider increases. In order to recover for a
breach of an implied warranty of results the consumer must prove
the following elements:
(1) That the rendition of a service resulted in a violation of
consumer expectations for results; 15
(2) the expectations for results were reasonable;
(3) rendition of the service was a producing cause of the violation of reasonable expectations for results;
(4) the consumer was adversely affected;
(5) there was available to the service-provider a technique or
knowledge sufficient to accomplish the reasonably expected
results.
The four categorical distinctions between services do not represent hard and fast analytical differences. For example, a termite
inspection resulting in a certificate or statement of termite presence to be relied upon could be put into category two or into category three. Similarly, the line separating categories three and four
is merely one of degree. Categories three and four could be
grouped into one larger category. The categorization of services is
indulged in only to demonstrate the differing characteristics of
many services which, for equally different reasons, facilitate and
justify application of an implied warranty of results.
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
Is

NOT NECESSARY IN CONSUMER SERVICE TRANSACTIONS

The test for reasonable expectations as advocated in this article
eliminates the need for utilization of an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose in service transactions. 16 In the sale of
goods context, the warranty declares that:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that
the buyer is relying on the sellers skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is ... an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose."1 7
215.
sumer's
216.
217.

In the case of category one services the first element would be a breach of the conexpectations for product performance.
That warranty is found in § 2-315 of the UCC.
U.C.C. § 2-315.
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This warranty is unnecessary in service transactions because the
test for the reasonableness of expectations would incorporate the
entire representational context of the service transaction. 1 8 In situations when the service-provider has reason to know that the service is procured for a particular result and that the consumer is
relying on the service-provider's skill or judgment to achieve that
result, a jury should find that an expectation of that result was
reasonable. The implied warranty of results would then supply the
needed protection. Thus, when a contractor installs a solar heating
system in a consumer's home, the representational context might
justify a reasonable expectation that the consumer's electricity bill
would be reduced by fifty percent. Similarly, given the proper representational context, a consumer may reasonably expect a moving
company to complete a cross country move in a day and a half.
APPLICATION OF IMPLIED WARRANTY TO ECONOMIC LOSS-SHIFTING
THE RISK OF LOSS TO THE SERVICE CONSUMER

Breach of implied warranty traditionally has been an appropriate vehicle for the recovery of economic losses.2 19 A large amount
of consumer losses resulting from defective services are solely economic. Because economic losses involve the same violations of consumer expectations as personal injuries and property damage it
would contravene consumer protection policy to exclude economic
loss from the purview of the implied warranty doctrine. Therefore,
the implied warranty of results should extend to economic loss as
well as to personal injury and property damage.
Analytically, however, economic loss is distinguishable in at least
one respect from personal injury and property damage. That difference concerns the right of the parties to a consumer transaction
to shift from service-provider to consumer the risk of a violation of
expectations, better known as the risk of loss.22 0 The implied warranty of results in service transactions should allow this shifting
only in circumstances involving economic loss.
This limited range of shifting to the consumer the risk of a violation of reasonable expectations can be explained as follows. The
shifting of the risk of loss in the form of personal injury or property damage should not be allowed. This principle has been recog-

218.
219.
220.
2-316.

See text accompanying notes 148-50 supra.
See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.
As applied to the sale of goods, this risk-shifting mechanism is embodied in UCC §

Loyola University Law journal

[Vol. 11

nized by the UCC and Restatement 402A. 221 Similarly, because
freedom of contract does not exist for consumers in consumer service transactions, service-providers should not be allowed to impose upon consumers blanket disclaimers of liability for economic
loss. If this were allowed, it would lead to the automatic inclusion
of disclaimers in the contract for services and frustrate the standards for service quality set by public policy.
The shifting of risk to consumers should be allowed only when
the shifting actually reflects freedom of choice by consumers. This
would occur only in situations where there exist several truly alternative service approaches to achieving results. True alternatives
would exist only when each alternative reflected meaningful differences in both relative value to the consumer and in the risks of
violation of reasonable expectations.
If two approaches to the rendition of a service existed that did
not reflect different relative values to the consumer, the consumer
would choose the alternative involving the least risk of a violation
of his expectations. In that situation, no freedom of choice would
exist for the consumer and the two approaches would not constitute true alternatives. Similarly, if the two approaches did not reflect a difference in the risk of a violation of expectations, the consumer would automatically choose the approach which had more
relative value to him. The two approaches in this situation also do
not present real freedom of choice and would not constitute true
alternatives.
Application of the risk shifting mechanism to a situation in
which true alternatives do not exist would result in a general
waiver of liability and should not be allowed. Furthermore, the
shifting of risks to the consumer should be allowed only upon a full
and understandable disclosure by the service-provider of the values and the risks involved with each alternative. Once a full disclosure is made, the consumer's reasonable expectations for each alternative would reflect the values and risks involved with each and
the consumer would be able to make a meaningful and informed
choice.222 The risk of a violation of expectations could then be
shifted without violating consumer protection policy.
These principles can be illustrated by the following hypotheticals. A part goes out on the consumer's car causing it to malfunc-

221. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719(3); Section 402A, comment m.
222. If such a disclosure was not made, the consumer's reasonable expectations would
not encompass the risks entailed in choosing the alternative with greater relative value.
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tion. He brings the car to a mechanic for repairs in order to enable
the car to function properly. The mechanic determines that the
defective part is one that serves two functions: it keeps the cooling
system functioning and it facilitates starting in cold weather. 2
The part is located at the bottom of the engine and its replacement would require several hours of labor to remove and reinstall
the engine. However, it is possible to bypass the part by connecting
portions of the cooling system, which would take only fifteen minutes of labor. Thus, there are two alternative approaches to achieving adequate product performance involving a difference in labor
cost of several hundred dollars.
Each alternative also involves different risks in terms of a violation of consumer expectations. Although the bypass alternative
would result in a properly functioning cooling system, the car
might be difficult to start in cold weather. The other alternative,
replacing the prart, would assure that the cooling system worked
and that the car was not difficult to start in the winter. If the service-provider gave the consumer a full disclosure of the costs and
risks of poor car performance involved with each alternative, the
shifting of the risk could be accomplished if the consumer chose
the less expensive alternative.2 2 4
The relative appeal to the consumer of each alternative will not
necessarily turn upon their respective costs. The difference may be
one of aesthetics. For example, the purchaser of a new car may
have a choice between a standard paint job or one with a metallic
finish. The latter may be more desirable to the consumer. However, it may also involve a greater risk of cracking and peeling than
the standard paint job. If the service-provider gives a full and understandable disclosure to the consumer of the risks involved, the
provider should be allowed to shift the risk of cracking and peeling
to the consumer when the consumer chooses the metallic paint
225
job.
This example is also useful to illustrate the result of a failure of

223. Such is the role of a "freeze plug" on a 1974 Renault 12 as it was explained to me.
224. These were the alternatives I faced when a freeze plug Went out on my Renault. I
chose the less expensive alternative. However, no explanation of the risks involved with each
alternative was made to me. Only after making my own inquiries did I learn that my car
would have trouble starting six months later when cold weather set in (Fortunately, four
months later my car blew a head gasket and I was able to have a new freeze plug installed at
no extra cost).
225. However, of course, the service-provider would be required to utilize all available
techniques and knowledge in providing the metallic paint job.
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the service-provider to make a full and understandable disclosure
of risks. Regardless of which alternative he selected, if the consumer was not aware of the relative risks of cracking and peeling,
the risk of such a violation of reasonable expectations could not be
passed to him by the service-provider, even if the consumer selected the metallic paint job.
APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION AND NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS

TO IMPLIED WARRANTY ACTIONS

Statutes of limitations and notice requirements will play a part
in determining the outcome of a number of warranty cases. Therefore, it is necessary to apply them so as not to frustrate consumer
protection policy.
Statutes of limitations are creations of policy, designed to assure
fairness to defendants. They promote justice by preventing surprises from the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared.'" However, the policies behind statutes of limitations are deemed not to be inflexible. In Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., the United States Supreme Court held that the policy
frequently may be outweighed when the interests of justice require
a vindication of the plaintiff's rights. 2" Thus, to the extent allowed
by statute in a given jurisdiction, limitations should be tailored to
fit consumer protection policy. Regarding the running of limitations in implied warranty cases, there are two basic concepts which
can be affected by the public policy of protecting consumers: 1) the
point in time that the statute of limitations begins to run, and 2)
the applicable period of limitations.
Under tort law, limitations begin to run when a defect in goods
is or reasonably should be discovered.1" The date of the transaction between the parties is not the controlling consideration. A
two-year limitation period traditionally has been applied to tort
actions.' " Traditional contract law, on the other hand, holds that
226. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
227. Id. at 428.
228. See, e.g., Ilardi v. Spaccapaniccia, 53 Ill. App. 3d 933, 369 N.E.2d 144 (1977);
Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons of Dallas, Inc., 351 S.W. 2d 119 (Tex. 1961).
229. See, e.g., Solt v. McDowell, 132 [Il. App. 2d 864, 272 N.E.2d 53 (1971); Richker v.
United Gas Corp., 436 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. 1968); Frankel v. Wolper, 228 N.Y. 582, 127 N.E.
913 (1920). Some jurisdictions apply a one or a three year limitations period.
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limitations begin to run at the time of delivery of the goods23 0 or at
the time of rendition of the service. 23 1 These dates are focused
upon by courts regardless of when a defect in the product or service becomes apparent. When a written contract is involved, a limitations period longer than the two-year tort period is applied. 32
Until recently, implied warranty actions for personal injury were
uniformly treated as tort actions with the cause of action accruing
when the defect was or should have been discovered and lasting for
two years. 2 83 Implied warranty actions for economic loss were
treated as contract actions, with the cause of action accruing when
the contract was made and lasting for more than two years.3 Several recent cases have been willing, to the extent allowed by statute, to use policy justifications to alter these rules in consumer
transactions. In Morton v. Texas Welding and Mfg. Co.,23 3 the
court, after citing the UCC's policy of uniformity in commercial
transactions and its mandate to liberally construe UCC provisions,
concluded that a cause of action for a breach of implied warranty
causing personal injury accrues on the date of injury 3 and lasts
for four years. 237 In Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co.,2 3 the
court broadly construed the principle of a warranty relating to a
future event23 9 to find a four-year cause of action for breach of an
implied warranty of a heating system which did not accrue until
leaks were discovered.2 40 Additionally, in Richman v. Watel,2 1" a
four-year cause of action accruing on the date that the damage occured was held to arise from the breach of an implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of a new home.
230. Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (Pa. 1965).
231. Hamilton v. General Motors Corp., 490 F. 2d 223 (1973); Harry Goldstein Realty
Co. v. City of Chicago, 306 Il. App. 556, 29 N.E.2d 283 (1940).
232. Written contract actions are greater than two years. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5527; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 17; UCC § 2-725; Hamilton v. General Motors Corp.
490 F. 2d 223 (1973).
233. See, e.g., Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954);
Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946); Finck v. Albers Super Markets,
136 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Fort Smith v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 101 Tex. 24, 102 S.W.
908 (1907).
234. See, e.g., Tomes v. Chrysler Corp. 60 111.App. 3d 707, 377 N.E.2d 224, (1978); Ideal
Builders Hardware Co. v. Cross Construction Co., 491 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
235. 408 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
236. Id. at 11.
237. Id. at 10-11.
238. 55 Cal.2d 573, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
239. This is now embodied in UCC § 2-725 (2).
240. 55 Cal.2d 583-84, 360 P.2d 903 (1961).
241. 565 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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These cases and consumer protection policy support the application in service warranty cases of a contractual period of limitation
which accrues only at the time the defectiveness of the service became or should have become apparent to the consumer. To charge
a consumer with knowledge of a cause of action before he can be
expected to realize he has one is unfair. Moreover, unlike most
businesses, the average consumer does not have counsel available
to indicate when the consumer's rights have been infringed, nor are
consumers often anxious to invest uncertain amounts of time and
money to hire a lawyer. In consumer service transactions, limitations should not begin to run until it is or should be apparent to
the consumer that a reasonably expected result will not accrue.
Public policy should also reflect the fact that consumers frequently
tend to procrastinate and "sit on their rights" more than other
classifications of persons. Thus, a contractual limitation period is
more appropriate in consumer service transactions.
As a corollary, public policy should encourage the most efficient
utilization of informal dispute resolving mechanisms. 42 This could
lead both to a reduction of court docket backlogs and a quick and
inexpensive resolution of consumer problems. Thus, the principle
of tolling the running of limitations should be utilized to encourage
consumers to file complaints with government and private consumer protection agencies before resorting to a lawyer and the legal system. 24 3 A consumer actively pursuing a claim or negotiations
through the local attorney general's consumer protection office or
through a bona fide private consumer protection organization cannot be said to be "sleeping on his rights." Therefore, the running
of limitations should be tolled during such periods.
Notice requirements are also creations of policy. They are
designed to promote informed resolution of commercial disputes.
In product transactions under the UCC, for example, consumers
are required to give notice of a defect in the product to their sellers
as a prerequisite to the right to recover damages for the defect.2"
The imposition of a notice requirement serves the purpose of letting the seller know a problem exists and gives him an opportunity
to cure the defect. 45 It can also serve to promote out of court set-

242. This public policy has been endorsed by Congress via the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1975).
243. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F. 2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
244. UCC § 2-607(3)(a).
245. Id., comment 4.
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tlements. 2 4 6 Therefore, in cases involving the rendition of defective
services causing solely economic loss a reasonable notice requirement should be applied. 47
In certain circumstances, however, notice requirements can be
unrealistic and may lead to injustice. In cases when the consumer
has suffered personal injury or property damage there is little logic
in the imposition of a notice requirement since it is too late to cure
the defect. Similarly, any notice requirement imposed upon a consumer who has not dealt directly with the service-provider should
be applied with caution. It is possible that the identity of the service-provider will not become apparent to the consumer in time for
him to give timely notice. Furthermore, since the giving of notice
of a defect is usually effected by the individual consumer prior to
hiring a lawyer, the law should not punish a consumer for failing to
go immediately to a service-provider with whom he never dealt. It
has been recognized that application of notice requirements
outside of privity as a prerequisite to recovery of damages can con24 8
stitute a "booby-trap for the unwary.
The law of consumer-service transactions should reflect an
awareness of the policy basis underlying statutes of limitations and
notice requirements. To the extent allowed by statute, these concepts should be tailored to comport with consumer protection
policy.
COMPLETING THE TASK OF MARKETPLACE REGULATION-EFFECTIVE
UTILIZATION OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY

DOCTRINE

. AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACTS

The implied warranty doctrine advocated in this article implements the most basic and necessary form of judicial regulation for

246. This is the apparent justification for the notice requirement contained in the progressive Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A
(1977).
247. In no case should the violation of a notice requirement cause a consumer to give up
as a matter of law his entire right to recovery. It should be left to the jury to determine
what reasonably would have been accomplished by the giving of notice by the aggrieved
consumer. The most efficacious notice requirement would be one that both reasonably penalizes the consumer for failing to comply with the requirement, and also gives the serviceprovider an opportunity to avoid greater damages. Thus, an incentive to settle can be engendered in both of the prospective parties to a lawsuit. The drafting of a progressive notice
requirement is, of course, a legislative and not a judicial function. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (1977) for a notice requirement which may apply by judicial
analogy to Texas consumer service transactions for breach of an implied warranty of results.
248. PRossER, supra note 17, at 655.

466 .
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consumers of services, that governing service quality. True consumer-tort regulation of the service marketplace cannot evolve,
however, upon regulation of service quality alone. The judiciary
must concern itself additionally with deterring abuses of bargaining power and with policing the flow of information from serviceproviders. Legal tools to accomplish these ends have been provided
by legislatures in most jurisdictions via enactment of unconscionability statutes and deceptive trade practices acts. Thus, while implied warranty regulates the quality of services provided, the unconscionability doctrine can regulate abuses of bargaining power
by service-providers and the deceptive trade practices acts can regulate the advertising, representations and other disclosures made
by service-providers. The remainder of this article briefly outlines
a path for interpretation of these statutes.
"For at least two hundred years equity courts have refused to
grant specific enforcement of contracts so unconscionable 'as no
man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other.' "249 In most jurisdictions, this doctrine has received statutory sanction via the UCC.2 50 UCC section 2-302 reads:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.
The prevalence of adhesion contracts in all consumer transactions
suggests the necessity for application of this doctrine to consumer
service transactions.
From the time of its development, the unconscionability doctrine has been underutilized and narrowly construed. Various factors have prevented this doctrine from becoming the tool for consumer protection that it should be. The term "unconscionability"
is not defined by the UCC except in vague and "value"-laden
terms. 51 Thus, as a new and largely untried doctrine, its lack of
specific and certain application has retarded its development and
has likely dampened judicial enthusiam for its efficacy. Further,

249.
250.
251.

J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 35, § 4-2 at 113-14.
U.C.C. § 2-302.
J. WHITE AND R. SuMmEs, supra note 35, § 4-2 at 116.
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unconscionability is intended by the UCC as a question for the
court.2 52 By keeping questions of unconscionability from the jury,

the UCC has further limited practical application of the doctrine.
In addition, it has been interpreted, unjustifiably, to be no more
than a shield for consumers from the effects of oppressive contract
terms. By failing to allow the recovery of damages by consumers
victimized by unconscionability, courts have done little to deter
such contracting practices.25

s

Finally, the unconscionability doc-

trine has been construed by many courts to apply only to contracts
and terms unconscionable at the time they are made, and not to
those which subsequently result in an unconscionable effect.25"4

A proper consumer-tort focus on the unconscionability doctrine
should center around a policy devoted to deterrence of unconscionable acts and practices. Deterrence would be most effectively
achieved by implementation of the following reforms: (1) the application of the unconscionability doctrine to consumer-service transactions as well as product transactions should be expressly sanctioned by the courts; (2) since the doctrine can logically apply to
all acts or practices involving parties in unequal bargaining positions, unconscionability should be applied beyond unfair contracts
and contract terms. Unconscionability is currently utilized to regulate only those acts or practices which arise from rights granted by
contract. In the consumer context, the doctrine should prescribe
any unconscionable act or practice that occurs during the course of
a transaction. For example, it should be recognized that the failure
of a service-provider to reasonably negotiate or compromise a
problem when the consumer is in a desparate situation can be unconscionable; (3) damage recoveries should be allowed along with
the striking of unconscionable contracts and contract clauses;2 55 (4)
any act or practice which results in a subsequent unconscionable
effect on a consumer should be found to fall within the purview of
the unconscionability doctrine. Thus, a consumer should not be penalized when a transaction resulting in a gross disparity in value
received and consideration paid by the consumer appeared fair and
conscionable at the time of contracting. This is particularly appro252. Id. at 114.
253. Thus, businesses have nothing to lose by committing unconscionable acts in contracting. The only risk involved in taking such actions is that occasionally a court will purge
the unconscionable effects of a contract.
254. J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 35, § 4-5 at 124.
255. Such recoveries are allowed in Texas, although it was the Legislature and not the
Judiciary that instituted this reform. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (1977).
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priate when applied to service transactions because it focuses upon
the results achieved by rendition of the service; (5) unconscionability should be utilized to reduce the occurrence of the most widespread consumer rip-off: excessive price. 5 6 Similarly, the imposition of charges upon a consumer which have no logical connection
to services rendered should be deterred by the unconscionability
doctrine. 5
Deceptive trade practices acts (DTPA's) provide a final cornerstone in the comprehensive formulation of consumer remedies.
Such acts exist in one form or another in most states.2 58 They reflect a philosophy of consumer transactions that is in line with the
analysis of this article. Consumer service and product transactions
are treated equally. 259 Both are fully subject to the provisions of
DTPA's. Privity requirements apparently are eliminated from the
DTPA in most jurisdictions. 60 Many of the DTPA's provide for
the recovery of attorney's fees and court costs for consumers successful in court.2 6' Some even provide for the trebling of damages
recovered by successful consumers. 6 2 Finally, the decline of fault
liability in setting a standard of liability for the quality of product
and service transactions is paralleled in the DTPA's. Most of the
specific violations of these acts do not require proof of intent or
knowledge. 2 5

256. J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 35, § 4-5 at 120-24.
257. This reform would be most important in jurisdictions which do not proscribe "unfair" trade practice. A representative fact situation was presented in Commonwealth v.
Decotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974). In Decotis, a lessor of mobile home lots
routinely imposed a fee on each lessee that resold his mobile home. No services were rendered by the lessor in return for the fee. Each collection of the resale fee would be unconscionable by virtue of this reform.
258. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 'A, §§ 262 and 312 (1977); TEx. Bus. & COMM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (1977).
259. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 I/2, § 312; TEx. Bus. & COMM. ANN. § 17.46.
260. For example, the Illinois DTPA provides that "Any person who suffers damage as a
this Act committed by any other person may bring an action
result of a violation of ...
against such person" (emphasis added). ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 121 /2, § 270 a(a); Similarly, the
Texas DTPA provides that a consumer may maintain an action for "the use or employment
by any person of an act or practice declared to be unlawful" by the DTPA (emphasis added). Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 17.50 (a) (1).
261. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,§ 270a (c).
262. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code section 17.50(b)(1). In Woods v. Littleton, 554
S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), the Texas Supreme Court held that the awarding of treble damages, attorney's fees and court costs to a victorious consumer was mandatory and not to be
left to the discretion of the court.
263. Of the twelve enumerated deceptive trade practices in Illinois, only two require
proof of intent. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 121 V, § 312 (1)-(12).
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There are several methods by which a dtpa may be violated in a
consumer service transaction. The Illinois DTPA provides that:
§ 2. A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the
course of his business, vocation or occupation, he:
(5) represents that. . . services have . . . characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have...
(7) represents that. . . services are a particular standard, quality
or grade . . . if they are of another;
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding. 6 '
These provisions reflect a direct concern for the protection of consumer expectations. These sections can help to assure that the full
representational context in which the service transaction takes
place is accounted for in determining reasonable consumer expectations for results from services. For example, any message of competence sent by a service-provider to a consumer should be considered a representation. 65 Thus, when a service-provider holds
himself out as an "attorney" or a "mechanic", the service-provider
sends a message to the consumer that he possesses a certain minimum of skills. Merely undertaking, for a fee, to perform a service
sends a similar representation of competence. These representations create in the consumer expectations for results that can be
achieved by the service-provider. If these results are not achieved,
then the above sections should be held to have been breached.
CONCLUSION

The law should be based on current concepts of what is right
and just and the judiciary should be alert to the neverending need
for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions which make no sense in today's society and
tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected....'"
The mandate for reform of consumer service transactions is
clear. Everyday each one of us plays the role of consumer many
times. We all have an interest in developing a system of laws which
helps put consumers on equal footing with businesses. The current
264. Id.
265.
266.

Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., Inc., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So.2d 767, 772 (1963).
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tex. 1968).
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law of negligence is inadequate to protect consumers who are powerless to protect themselves from the consequences of defective
services. The great reforms achieved in product liability law provide an impetus for judicial reform of the law governing service
transactions. At the center of the reforms should be an implied
warranty of results based upon reasonable consumer expectations.
By providing a mechanism for shaping the implied warranty of results to reflect the complexity of each service, it is hoped that this
article has demonstrated the practicality of an implied warranty of
results. Full reform of service liability necessarily entails application of other consumer-tort concepts. The most important of these
include a liberal application of the doctrine of unconscionability
and deceptive trade practice theories. This article is concerned
with justice and fairness in the law. From that perspective, it is
clear that the reform of service liability is long overdue.
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